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ATKINS, ADOLESCENCE, AND THE MATURITY
HEURISTIC: RATIONALES FOR A CATEGORICAL
EXEMPTION FOR JUVENILES FROM CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
JEFFREY FAGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia,' the U.S. Supreme Court voted six to three to bar further
use of the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. The Court offered three
reasons for banning the execution of the retarded. First, citing a shift in public
opinion over the thirteen years since Penry v. Lynaugh,2 the Court in Atkins ruled
that the execution of the mentally retarded is "cruel and unusual punishment"
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Second, the Court concluded that retaining
the death penalty for the mentally retarded would not serve the interest in
retribution or deterrence that is essential to capital jurisprudence. Atkins held that
mentally retarded people lacked a range of developmental capacities necessary to
establish the higher threshold of culpability for the execution of murderers that the
Court had established in Furman,3 Gregg,4 Coker,5 Woodson,6 and Enmund.7 Third,
the Atkins Court noted that the impairments of mental retardation lead to a "special
risk of wrongful execution." 8
The Atkins decision, though welcomed by both popular and legal policy
audiences, naturally raises the question: what about juveniles? After all, the very
same limitations in developmental capacities that characterize mentally retarded
defendants also characterize a significant proportion of adolescent offenders.9 The
parallels between capital punishment for adolescents and for the mentally retarded
have been echoed both in popular and legal discourse since the resumption of
capital punishment following Furman." Prior to Atkins, many groups protested the
* Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University. Thanks to Joyce Lan Kim and Gabriel Miller
for excellent research assistance. Barry Feld, Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Scott, Elizabeth Cauffman, and
members of the MacArthur Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice provided many
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
6. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
7. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
8. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350.
9. See, e.g., Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 12-14, Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (No. 02-6010), at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjust/supreme%20court%20petition.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003) (quoting
App. E, Declaration of Ruben C. Gur). See also Juvenile Justice Center, American Bar Association, Adolescent
BrainDevelopment andLegal Culpability,at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheetsbrain_development
.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
10. The American Bar Association (ABA) resolution calling for a ban on the execution of individuals for
capital crimes committed before their eighteenth birthday also calls for a ban on executions of the mentally
retarded:
The ABA has established policies against the execution of both persons with "mental
retardation," as defined by the American Association of Mental Retardation, and persons who
were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality ofexecutions in both of those instances. While many states now bar
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use of capital punishment for both types of offenders, invoking arguments against
capital punishment that applied equally to each.l" The popular coupling of concerns
about adolescents with concerns about the mentally retarded seemed to naturally
invite an extension of the Atkins Court's reasoning to juveniles by highlighting the
diminished capacity for culpability common to offenders of both groups. 2 In fact,
on August 30, 2002, in a rare dissent from an order declining to stay an execution,
Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg urged the Court to reconsider the
constitutionality of allowing juveniles to be sentenced to death. 3 In reference to the
Atkins decision, the Justices argued that reexamining the "juvenile" issue was
warranted, thereby underscoring yet again the similarities between both cases.
Whether these Justices were referring to normative concerns or scientific
evidence is unclear. Both clinical and empirical evidence suggest, however, that
many of the same deficits in various cognitive competencies that define
"retardation" also are markers of adolescence. In Atkins, the Court found that
persons with mental retardation have "diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand
the reactions of others."' 4 Recent empirical and theoretical scholarship on the
developmental capacities of adolescents generally, and adolescent offenders in
particular, suggests that adolescence itself is characterized by a constellation of
development deficits that closely align with the developmental incapacities of the
mentally retarded. 1' In fact, these characteristics may be so closely aligned as to
establish their categorical similarity.

executions of the retarded, other states continue to execute both retarded individuals and, on
occasion, offenders who were under 18 at the time they committed the offenses for which they
were executed.
American Bar Association, American BarAssociation Resolution and Report, reprintedin Victor Streib, ABA 's
ProposedMoratorium:Moratorium on the Death Penaliyfor Juveniles, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 app. at
230 (1998).
11. However, several commentators opposed this linkage.
For analysis, the young and the retarded should not be treated the same, and generally are not
for legal and governmental purposes such as rights to vote, to drink, to marry, and the like. In
actual practice,... the legislatures and courts have not treated these categories the same for
purposes of the death penalty.
Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children,and the Retarded: Second Class Citizens in CapitalPunishment,
in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THEPAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE

ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
12. A May 2002 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted one month before the Atkins decision, found that
64 percent of Americans support the death penalty, but 69 percent of Americans oppose executing juveniles. About
58 percent of the American population lives in states that prohibit the execution of juveniles, compared to 51
percent who live in states that opposed execution of the mentally retarded at the time that Atkins was decided.
JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death
PenaltyEvolving StandardsofDecency, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/factsheets-evolving-standards
.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
13. See Patterson v. Texas, 936 U.S. 984 (2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J., dissenting). See also
In re Kevin Nigel Stanford, 1235 S.Ct. 472 (2002) (mem.) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens once again
called for an end to the execution of capital offenders who committed their crimes before reaching the age of
eighteen. Citing public opinion polling results, he noted that the majority of Americans in 2001 indicated that the
death penalty should not be applied to juveniles. Id. at 6; Adam Liptak, 3 Justices Call for Reviewing Death
Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at Al.
14. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
15. See infra notes 42 and 85 and accompanying text.
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This cluster of developmental incapacities places both adolescents and mentally
retarded persons below the threshold of culpability that constitutional jurisprudence
mandates in capital cases. 6 Extending the logic of Atkins tojuveniles, then, requires
analyses showing that (a) many of the developmental characteristics that establish
the diminished culpability of the mentally retarded also characterize adolescents;
(b) the age-specific competencies for adolescents that define maturity and in turn
culpability can be identified and then reliably measured; and (c) the age at which
adolescents attain these competencies and when their developmental trajectory
begins-that is, the age at which adolescent development measurably departs, both
substantively and permanently, from the stable and flat developmental trajectories
of the mentally retarded.
The latter question further complicates the application of the Atkins holding to
juveniles. Bright lines are not the preferred conclusions of social scientists, often
to the frustration of legal scholars. 17 The age at which adolescents realize the
developmental competencies that constitute culpability will vary: a significant
number of juveniles will be immature and lacking in the developmental attributes
of culpability well before age eighteen, and some may still lack these competencies
after age eighteen: a few may have attained full maturity by the age threshold of
sixteen set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, 8 but most will not.
In other words, the risk of serious reversible error is higher for adolescents due to
the variability in the age at which they attain the capacities necessary for
culpability. Failing to account for this fact invites the risk of executing an
adolescent whose culpability does not rise to the constitutional thresholds defined
in Atkins or other death penalty cases that set a high bar of culpability. 9 This risk
is acute and more jurisprudentially challenging than the considerations that attach
to mentally retarded adults.
This article addresses these questions by first examining both the jurisprudence
and social science of retardation. Whereas the courts have given primacy to determinations of intelligence quotient (IQ) to assess mental retardation, clinical and
epidemiological evidence suggests that retardation is a multidimensional diagnostic
category and its determination is fraught with scientific judgments that carry
varying degrees of error. The Court recognized this complexity in Atkins, pointing

16. The Court in Atkins also stated that mentally retarded persons are less likely to meet tests that establish
their trial competence: they are more vulnerable to false confessions and less able to assist counsel at trial, they are
"less likely [to] process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty," making them vulnerable to
.a special risk of wrongful execution." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-32. The Association of Retarded Citizens (ARC)
points out that a mentally retarded individual may (a) pretend to understand concepts that he does not, (b) not want
his condition to be viewed as a disability, (c) say what he thinks others want to hear, (d) be overwhelmed by the
presence of authority, and (e) have difficulty describing the details of events to others. See Association for Retarded
Citizens, Several Statements aboutMental Retardation,at http://www.geocities.com/savepenry/statements.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2003). These same incompetencies limit the ability of adolescents to meet the procedural
standards for trial as an adult. See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Robert Schwartz & Thomas Grisso eds., 2000). Despite the conceptual and empirical convergence of the
dimensions of competence and culpability, I focus in this article only on the question of culpability.
17. See generally Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (2000); Robert
C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship, 29 J.LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000); Michael Heise, The Importanceof Being
Empirical, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999).
18. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
19. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
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out the significance of social and psychological underdevelopment. Accordingly,
the article begins by decomposing the diagnostic category of retardation into
specific dimensions of underdevelopment. Second, the article analyzes the correspondence of these dimensions of underdevelopment among the retarded to legal
standards about immaturity and culpability of adolescents. If children are in fact less
"formed" developmentally than adults, they lack full capacity and therefore are
"less culpable" than adults. But what characteristics define immaturity among
adolescents, and how do these mirror the incapacities of retarded adults? Finally,
the article addresses both the convergence of the two vectors of underdevelopment
and the difficulty of establishing reliable chronological markers when such capacities attain. A substantial number of adolescents sentenced to death for crimes
committed before age eighteen will reflect a pattern of developmental and cognitive
incapacities that place them well below the threshold of culpability that also
exempts the mentally retarded. Death penalty jurisprudence suggests that sentencing
these persons to death invites the risk of serious error. These issues all highlight the
conflict between normative and social science considerations of maturity, capacity,
and development, which both further complicate the extension of Atkins to adolescents and present challenges for the imminent debate about the executions of
minors.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RETARDATION
A. Penry and the Culpability of Mentally Retarded People
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the execution of mentally
retarded people convicted of capital offenses was not categorically prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.2" Johnny Paul Penry had been convicted of the brutal rape and
murder of Pamela Carpenter in her home in Livingston, Texas, in October 1979. A
clinical psychologist had testified at a competency hearing before trial that Penry
was mentally retarded with an IQ of 54 . 2 The psychologists testified that Penry had
the mental age of a six-and-one-half-year old, that his ability to function socially
with the world was also that of a nine- or ten-year old, that he suffered from
moderate retardation that led to poor impulse control and an inability to learn from
his own experiences, and that it was impossible for him to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to change his own behavior to conform to the law
due to organic brain damage he had suffered as a child.22
The Supreme Court's discussion of the treatment of mentally retarded persons
in Penry focused primarily on "idiots" and "lunatics" in common law.23 In tracing
the common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" and "lunatics," the Court
quoted Blackstone, who wrote,

20. Penry, 492 U.S. at 280 (1989).
21. This would place Penry in either the category of "mild" retardation (individuals with an IQ score range
of 50-55 and 70) or "moderate" retardation (IQ scores in the range of 35-40 to 50-55), according to the AAMR
classifications. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3 (quoting AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).

22. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
23. Id. at 286.
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The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of crimes,
arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an idiot or a
lunatic.... [I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if
committed when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself .... [A]
total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the
punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the
senses.... 24
The Court also quoted Hale on the culpability of a man born deaf and mute who
"is in presumption of law an idiot.. .because he hath no possibility to understand
what is forbidden by law to be done, or under what penalties: but if it can appear,
that he hath the use of understanding .... then he may be tried, and suffer judgment
and execution., 25 Having generally established mental retardation as a factor that
may reduce one's culpability for a criminal act, the Court addressed the issue of
whether, because of their diminished culpability, the imposition of capital punishment on individuals with mental retardation would be unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment's protection against "cruel and unusual punishment." After
reviewing state statutes, the Court held that no national consensus had emerged on
the issue and that procedural safeguards that allowed sentencers to consider
mitigating factors would allow for an individualized determination to be made in
every case. Relying on a publication of the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) that described the mentally retarded as "a heterogeneous population, ranging from totally dependant to nearly independent people," the Court
stated, "In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded
persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally retarded
people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the
death penalty."26
Rejecting a categorical exclusion and acknowledging that mentally retarded
individuals suffer from an impairment of certain cognitive abilities, the Court still
held that the degree of culpability possessed by Penry and a class of individuals
with similar abilities was adequate to justify the imposition of the death penalty.27

24. Id. at 331 (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 24-25 (1792)).
25. Id. at 332 (quoting M. HALE, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1736)).
26. Id. at 338-39.
27. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that "retardation has long been regarded as a factor
that may diminish culpability...." Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
In its most severe form, mental retardation may result in complete exculpation... Mentally
retarded persons, however, are individuals whose abilities and behavioral deficits can vary
greatly depending on the degree of their retardation, their life experience, and the ameliorative
effects of education and habilitation. On the present record, it cannot be said that all mentally
retarded people of petitioner's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart
from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the
death penalty. Moreover, the concept of "mental age" is an insufficient basis for a categorical
Eighth Amendment rule, since it is imprecise, does not adequately account for individuals'
varying experiences and abilities, [and] ceases to change after a person reaches the
chronological age of 15 or 16....
Penry, 492 U.S. at 306.
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B. The Cognitive and Developmental Components of Mental Retardation
Thirteen years after Penry, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins v.
Virginia28 and once again addressed the question of whether the imposition of
capital punishment on mentally retarded people was unconstitutional. In Atkins,
however, the Court overturned the Penry decision citing among other factors the
emergence of a national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
' '29
people. The Court stated that "the consistency of the direction of change among
the state legislative enactments on the issue "provides powerful evidence that today
our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal."3 ° Note 21 in Atkins elaborated upon the positions taken by
professional and religious organizations and even foreign nations to evidence a
"broader social and professional consensus."' These positions focused on both
subaverage general intellectual functioning (i.e., low IQ) and significant limitations
in social and interpersonal behaviors broadly categorized as "adaptive
functioning. 3 2
1. IQ as a Focal Marker of Retardation
The Supreme Court in Atkins initially cited a series of narrow definitions that
focused heavily on IQ as a marker of retardation. For example, the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) definition states,
Mental retardationrefers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure,
and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18."
The American Psychiatric Association's (APA) definition also was presented in
Atkins:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years
(Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen

Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316 n.21.
Id. at 309 n.3.
Id. at 309 (quoting AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the
functioning of the central nervous system.'
The World Health Organization (WHO), whose International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (tenth revision) enjoys
greater acceptance internationally, also focuses on IQ in its definition of mental
retardation:35 "Degrees of mental retardation are conventionally estimated by
standardized intelligence tests. These can be supplemented by scales assessing
social adaptation in a given environment., 36 The emphasis on intelligence noted
here has been pervasive in statutory definitions of mental retardation. Virtually
every state statute that prohibits the execution of "mentally retarded" persons
defines such a condition as "a mental deficit that has resulted in significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, where the onset of the forgoing conditions
occurred before the defendant reached the age of eighteen. 37 In addition, about onethird of the states have set a maximum numerical IQ level for a mentally retarded
individual-nearly all use a threshold of 70.38

34. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000)).
35. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND

RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS (ICD-10) 91-93 (1999).
36. Id. at 91.
37. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2002). All statutes prohibiting the death penalty for people with
mental retardation can be found at Death Penalty Information Center, State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty
forPeople with MentalRetardation,at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did= 138&scid=28 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2003).
38. See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues,
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). Most of the existing state
legislation on this topic defines mental retardation in general terms, as "concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior,"
but also generally applies the definition to persons with an IQ score of 70 or below, and additionally some individuals with scores in the low 70s (and even mid-70s), depending on the nature of the testing information. See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(1)-(3) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
However, the identification of the upper boundary of mental retardation cannot be stated with complete precision
in terms of IQ scores. This upper boundary of IQs to classify a person as mentally retarded reflects the statistical
variance inherent in all intelligence tests and the need to accommodate clinical judgment. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
ON MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 11 (1983) (This upper limit
is intended as a guideline; it could be extended upward through an IQ of 75 or more, depending on the reliability
of the intelligence test used. This particularly applies in schools and similar settings if behavior is impaired and
clinically determined to be due to deficits in reasoning and judgment); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) (Thus, it is possible to diagnose

mental retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior.). See generally AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., 1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, MENTAL RETARDATION: DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 5 (2002). Despite

the desirability of a bright line standard measurable by a single IQ test, Ellis says that other factors must be
considered to inform and contextualize the clinical judgment of experienced diagnosticians. Ellis, supra. This fact
is reflected in the Atkins decision, where the Court noted that "an IQ between 70 and 75 is typically considered the
cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
See also Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2565 (2003) (suggesting that the perspectives of mental
retardation professionals be integrated into states' legislation implementing Atkins to guide courts and juries in
determining which defendants possess the culpability and mental capacity to face execution for their crimes);
Alexis Krulish Dowling, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing the
Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 773 (2003) (showing that the absence of standards to guide the
determination of mental retardation will result in arbitrariness and bias in the imposition of the death penalty and
recommending that state legislatures uniformly adopt the current AAMR definition as the standard for determining
mental retardation).
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The clinical, scientific, and normative issues regarding the culpability of mentally
retarded individuals did not evolve much in the years between the Penryand Atkins
decisions. No major advancements in the classification of mental retardation had
been reported in the intervening time, and IQ remained the focal point in clinical
and statutory definitions of mental retardation. The Court's reasoning in Atkins was
focused more on the normative consensus emerging in the states and less on
changing professional views of the capacities of individuals whose IQ hovers at the
widely recognized threshold of 70. However, the emphasis on IQ masks important
developmental competencies that are concomitant with mental retardation and form
the scientific and conceptual basis for extending the inner logic of Atkins to
adolescents. This dimensionality is examined next.
2. The Dimensionality of Mental Retardation
The Court in Atkins recognized the limitations of a narrow and singular definition
of mental retardation and invoked a definition more consistent with the Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence of Enmund, Woodson, Coker, and other cases.39 Despite
the hegemony of IQ as a marker of retardation in both clinical practice and state
law, Atkins went beyond the normative consensus to articulate a jurisprudence of
mental retardation that bears directly on the culpability of mentally retarded persons
for criminal sanctions generally. The Court then identified their culpability relative
to the higher capital standard set by Enmund and other cases that constitute the
"death is different" capital jurisprudence.
Unlike Penry, which relied upon the "idiots and lunatics" jurisprudence of the
common law, the characterizations of retardation in Atkins relied upon not just
clinical definitions of mental retardation but ranged wider to embrace social science
evidence that establishes characteristics of mental retardation. That is, the Court
coupled the extrinsic sociopolitical consensus argument with a second more
descriptive and straightforward approach: invoking justice. By relying on simple
biological and psychological arguments to explain why mentally retarded individuals should not be held to the same standards of culpability as fully developed
adults, the Atkins Court made an important statement about the role of accountability in capital cases.
At the fulcrum of this discussion are the dynamics of social and mental development. The Court posited that "[blecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses... [mentally retarded persons] do not act
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of
capital proceedings against [them]."4
This reasoning presupposes a fundamental point: mentally retarded individuals
are not as psychologically, mentally, and socially developed as normal adults and,
therefore, do not display the same abilities of reason or culpability. There are
several steps to take in arguing for this logical progression by the Court. The first
and most important is to examine the various definitions of "mental retardation"

39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-14.
40. Id. at 306.
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found in law, medicine, and psychology to ascertain a more comprehensive understanding of what is essential in demarcating a mentally retarded individual from an
average adult. Turn again to the Court's own words. The Atkins Court instructs,
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however,
by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely
to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that
they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that
in group settings, they are followers rather than leaders.4
The logic seems self-evident: because of a stall in mental and social development,
these individuals are biologically more vulnerable to outside influence, to acting on
impulse, and to not thinking through the consequences of their actions. Atkins
specifically referenced characteristics common to both the mentally retarded and
juveniles: a susceptibility to influence, a lack of maturity and perspective, and a
lower degree of moral culpability.42 The Court concluded that these deficiencies
may not exempt mentally retarded persons from criminal sanctions, but they do
diminish the culpability well below the constitutional threshold for a death
sentence.43
For example, adopting the recommendations of the Utah Sentencing Commission, 44 the Utah legislature recently passed Senate Bill 8, incorporating the Atkins
decision into Utah law, 45 and the Governor signed it into law on March 15, 2003.
The bill sets up a procedure to make the mental retardation determination before
trial. A defendant found mentally retarded could still be tried for murder but could
not be subjected to the death penalty. IQ is only one of many factors to be
considered in classifying a person as mentally retarded.46 The definition in Utah's
proposed law reads that a person would be regarded as mentally retarded if the
individual "has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that results
in and exists concurrently with significant deficits in adaptive functioning that exist
primarily in the areas of reasoning, judgment and impulse control" and the
"subaverage general intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in
adaptive functioning... are both manifested prior to age 22.
The Utah statute also states that a person's IQ should not be the only determining
factor since different IQ tests produce different results, IQ often is considered a

41. Id. at 318. On this point, the Court cited social science evidence. Id. at 318 nn.23, 24.
42. These characteristics were defined for juveniles below the age of 18 in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 113-17 (1982). See generally Elizabeth Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
VILE. L. REV. 1607 (1992).
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
44. See Utah Sentencing Commission, Minutes (Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.justice.utah.gov/Minutes
Agendas/sentminOctober.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
45. 2003 Utah Laws Ch.i I (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1953)).
46. Id.
47. S.8, 2003 Leg. § 77-15a-102 (Ut. 2003), available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2003/bills/sbillenr/
sbOO08.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
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range rather than a fixed number and using the traditional IQ of 70 would be both
overinclusive and underinclusive. The statute further states that the signs of
retardation should have emerged before age twenty-two, although there was sharp
internal division within the commission over this provision. Finally, the statute
recommends that the death penalty should not be sought against a mentally impaired
person who confesses to a crime unless there is outside corroborating evidence.
Utah may be atypical, however, where it focuses on markers other than IQ to
determine degrees of mental retardation. Many current statutes in other states
require two necessary elements to declare a defendant mentally retarded: low
intellectual functioning and subnormal adaptive behavior.4 8 These statutes typically
provide a broad definition for each of these requirements. Most states, however, set
the intellectual functioning standard at a specified IQ level (70 or 75) or leave the
evaluation in the hands of a court appointed psychologist. Some states have not
provided any definition for the adaptive behavior prong of mental retardation,
leaving it open to court interpretation. South Dakota and Tennessee are examples
of states using this approach.49 Many states have taken steps to define the "adaptive
behavior" element. Arizona, Connecticut, and Kansas are virtually identical in their
wording in this respect.5 North Carolina and Missouri provide more comprehensive
definitions of each component of the definition. For example, Missouri statutes
decompose adaptive behavior into specific components: "communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure and work, which conditions are manifested and
documented before eighteen years of age."'"
While there are some differences in defining the "adaptive behavior" prong of
mental retardation among the various statutes on point, each state with such a
definition includes one common element: the defendant lacks independence and
social responsibility in relationship to others in that community or cultural group.
Only the Utah statute thus far has taken the additional step to incorporate specific
markers of developmental incapacities into a definition of mental retardation. Social
science, and especially developmental psychology, has taken note of the specific

48. All of the statutes prohibiting the death penalty for people with mental retardation can be found at Death
Penalty Information Center, State Statutes Prohibitingthe Death Penaltyfor People with Mental Retardation,
available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&did=138 (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
49. For example, Tennessee statutes are typical in drawing a bright line for IQ but leaving vague the criteria
for determining "adaptive" behavior. The issue of age of determination attests to the dimension of stability that
informs several statutes, an inherent claim of the intractability and organic nature of the disability. The Tennessee
statute states,
"Mental retardation" means substantial limitations in functioning: (A) As shown by significantly
sub-average intellectual functioning that exists concurrently with related limitations in two (2)
or more of the following adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work;
and (B) That are manifested before eighteen (18) years of age.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-1-101 (2003).
50. The Connecticut statute defines mental retardation as "[slignificantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental
period." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1
g(a) (2001). Adaptive behavior "means the effectiveness or degree with which an
individual meets the standards ofpersonal independence and social responsibility expected for the individual's age
and cultural group." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2001)(b).
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030(2003).
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dimensions of adaptive behavior, generally offering a broader definition that
includes (a) initiating, interacting, and terminating interaction with others; (b)
regulating one's own behavior and controlling impulses; (c) making choices; and
(d) conforming conduct to laws. 2 In this regard, the states lag well behind the social
science evidence on the cognitive, emotional regulatory, and neuropsychological
deficits that comprise retardation.53
3. The Culpability of Mentally Retarded Offenders in Capital Cases
The Court in Atkins stated that "[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser
culpability...surely does not merit that form of retribution only the most deserving
ofexecution are put to death... 54 Accordingly, even if a mentally retarded murderer
does not meet the strict statutory requirements of being "significantly subaverage"
in their intellectual and adaptive abilities, he or she is sufficiently subaverage on the
dimensions of "adaptive behavior" to substantially challenge the assertion that a
mentally retarded person should ever be considered one of "the most deserving of
execution."
The bridge between legal responsibility and moral responsibility can be
understood at the intersection of the two purported goals of the criminal justice
system, punishment and deterrence. A minimum amount of cognitive understanding
is necessary for either goal to be served in any measurable manner. If the defendant
is so mentally retarded that he has no understanding of right and wrong or does not
have the memory capacity to recollect the crime for which he is being held
accountable, then we can assume that he will not be able to appreciate the
relationship between his action and the punishment. Other similarly situated
individuals, lacking the same cognitive abilities, will lack the mental capacity to
understand the crime-punishment relationship or control their actions to conform
to social norms. By most clinical definitions, a mentally retarded person's capacity
is permanently frozen at a particular mental age.55 Thus, if an individual lacks the
capacity to make a moral judgment about right and wrong and alter their actions in
accordance with their moral judgment, then it serves no function to place moral
blame and punishment upon that actor.
In Atkins, the Court stated two significant reasons for disallowing the execution
of mentally retarded offenders. First, given the characteristics of their disability,

52. See ALAN S. KAUFMAN, ASSESSING ADOLESCENT AND ADULT INTELLIGENCE 549 (1990) for a discussion
of adaptive skills. See also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE INMENTAL RETARDATION 27 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., 1996).
53. See generally supra note 37.
54. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
55. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS I (Ruth Luckasson ed., 10th ed. 2002). In addition to providing the
current definition of mental retardation and explaining related concepts and terminology, the 2002 edition of this

manual provides valuable background on such topics as the history of classification, clinical assessment of people
with mental retardation, and an extensive bibliography of references to the clinical literature. The formulation in
the 2002 AAMR definition requires that the individual manifest a disability characterized by significant limitations

both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills. Any behavioral adjustments or changes over time by mentally retarded persons do not signify improvements
in mental functioning but reflect only the ability to overcome "adaptive limitations" from life experience/habit.
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mentally retarded people are not uniquely culpable under the law. While the Court
in Gregg identified retribution and deterrence as the social purposes served by the
death penalty,56 there is substantial doubt about whether retribution in cases
involving the mentally retarded is best served by executing them. In Godfrey v.
Georgia,for example, the Court set aside a death penalty because the crimes did not
reflect a consciousness materially more "depraved than that of any person guilty of
murder."57 Indeed, the Atkins Court similarly recognized that mentally retarded
persons have diminished capacity to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, and to control
impulses.5 8 Accordingly, the Court adopted a functionalist perspective, arguing that
the application of capital punishment to mentally retarded offenders did not serve
the retribution goal of matching the severity of the punishment to the crime.
The Atkins Court also held that mentally retarded persons are unlikely to realize
a deterrent effect of capital jurisprudence. Explaining that the same cognitive
impairments that classify individuals as mentally retarded also interfere with their
ability to understand the law, the Court held that the deterrent effect of possible
capital punishment is essentially lost on prospective mentally retarded offenders:
[Ilt is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants
less morally culpable-for example, the diminished ability to understand and
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning,
or to control impulses-that also make it less likely that they can process the
information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally
retarded from execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with
respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are
unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of execution.
Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of
deterrence.59
The Gregg Court relied on Enmund v. Florida,noting, "it seems likely that
capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation."6 Citing Fisherv. UnitedStates,6 ' the Gregg Court
continued to explain, "for if a person does not intend that life be taken or
contemplate that lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility that the
death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not "enter into the
cold calculus that precedes the decision to act."6 2 Regarding the coupling of
deterrence and retribution, the Enmund Court found that unless the death penalty
contributes to one or both of these goals, capital punishment "is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 320.
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799.
328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (footnote omitted).
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unconstitutional punishment.6 3 Absent a consciousness not just of the moral wrong
of murder, but of the aggravating conditions that qualify the case for death, the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient for the death penalty.
Furthermore, if a mentally retarded person lacks the logical reasoning skills, the
maturity, and the ability to think in long-range causal terms, as some argue, it is
inconsistent to hold such a person to the higher standard of either legal
responsibility or moral culpability required for a death sentence.
The Court next explained that the disabilities of the mentally retarded not only
affect decision making during the commission of their crimes, but also affect them
after they have been apprehended and convicted. In this respect, the Court found
that the same psychological and intellectual inferiority that leads to the poor
decision to commit the act in the first place also "undermines the strength of the
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards."' If an
individual is more likely to be intimidated by authority, to be poor, to have a
difficult time recounting events in great detail, and to act in a manner beyond which
his intellectual faculties can sustain him, the criminal process is likely to be an
unjust burden.
Mentally retarded persons are, by definition, deficient in many of these areas and
are therefore at a distinct disadvantage in the capital process. In addition to holding
that the goals of the death penalty were not furthered by the inclusion of the
mentally retarded, the Atkins Court overruled the Penry Court's holding that
consideration of mitigating factors by the sentencer will adequately ensure
individualized consideration in determining a mentally retarded defendant's
culpability. The diminished capacity of mentally retarded persons to competently
participate in the trial process contributes to the higher risk of serious error in both
the trial and sentencing phases of their capital trials. It is not hard to imagine how
a mentally retarded person might have a lesser ability to make a persuasive showing
of mitigation. For example, citing recent exonerations involving false confessions
and "the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive
showing of mitigation,"6 5 the Court stated that "[m]entally retarded defendants in
the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution."66
C. The Court's Role in DiagnosingMental Retardation
Before the Atkins decision, mental retardation was considered as a mitigating
factor to punishment in death penalty cases. If the level of mental retardation was
not so severe as to affect the defendant's competency to stand trial, the courts were
not required to make any special determinations or adopt any specific procedural
standards when dealing with a defendant with "mild" or "moderate" mental
retardation. Judges were not required to change their procedures to conform to the
clinical definitions of mental retardation. Rather, juries were often presented with

63.
64.
65.
66.

Enmund, 458 U.S at 798 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
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the testimony of expert witnesses who testified about both the IQ of defendants and
their individual developmental characteristics.
In Penry, a clinical psychologist testified at a competency hearing before trial
that Mr. Penry was mentally retarded with an IQ of 54.67 The psychologists testified
that based on his evaluation, Mr. Penry had the mental age of a six-and-one-halfyear old and that his ability to function socially with the world was also that of a
nine- or ten-year old. However, Mr. Penry's moderate to mild levels of mental
retardation did not weigh heavily enough in the eyes of the jury to prevent him from
adequately representing his interests and the jury found Penry competent to stand
trial.
At trial, Penry's attorneys raised an insanity defense (one alternative for mentally
retarded defendants who are not so severely impaired as to be deemed unable to
stand trial) and the testimony of another psychiatrist was introduced. The
psychiatrist testified that the defendant suffered from moderate retardation that led
to poor impulse control and an inability to learn from his own experiences. In
addition, the psychiatrist testified that because of the organic brain damage Mr.
Penry suffered at an early age, it was impossible for him to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to change his own behavior to conform to the law.
The state presented testimony of two psychiatrists in rebuttal. One psychiatrist
testified that the defendant was not suffering from any mental defect or illness at the
time of the crime, while the other testified that he had personally diagnosed Penry
as mentally retarded in both 1973 and 1977, but that Mr. Penry was legally sane at
the time of the crime. In the face of the dueling testimonies of the three
psychiatrists, the jury rejected Mr. Penry's insanity defense and rendered a guilty
verdict.
Good law during the Penry case did not require the jury to categorically exempt
Mr. Penry from capital punishment simply by virtue of his mental retardation.
Rather, the defense was permitted to present testimony about his mental
development, such as his violent upbringing, that the jury would weigh along side
other mitigating factors. Accordingly, in this case, the jury was allowed to consider
the testimony of different expert witnesses who delivered competing testimony
supporting claims that the defendant was or was not mentally retarded. Given the
inconsistency of the psychological evaluations, the jury chose not to heavily weigh
Mr. Penry's mental development.
In most cases, prosecuting attorneys use this ambiguity to their advantage. In
Wills v. Texas, the prosecuting attorney was quoted during closing of the original
trial as urging the jury not to "have any sympathy for the defendant because he's a
little slow or he's borderline mentally retarded ....
Don't say 'Poor Old Bobby Joe,
he's a little slow, he's borderline mentally retarded. Let's give him a break. '"'68
As the dueling expert witnesses in Penry show, there is considerable
disagreement among mental health professionals when rendering a diagnosis of
mental retardation in individual cases. Historically, the courts have not been
67. This would place Penry in either the category of "mild" retardation (individuals with an IQ score range

of between 50 or 55 and 70), or "moderate" retardation (IQ scores in the range from a low of 35-40 to 50-55),
according to the AAMR classifications. See supra note 55.
68. Wills v. Texas, 511 U.S. 1097 (1994) (citing Pet. for Cert. at 10).
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required to resolve questions about a defendant's possible mental retardation.
Rather, the role of the courts has been to provide a forum for the presentation of
multiple diagnoses. Although this apparent inconsistency in the reliability of mental
retardation diagnoses has made its way into the courtroom, the lack of a categorical
exemption for people with mental retardation has temporarily provided a way for
the criminal justice system to avoid addressing the threshold question of exactly
when someone is mentally retarded. As in Penry, the challenge of understanding a
defendant's mental condition has been pushed onto the jury, consistent with the
recent Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey69 and Ring v. Arizona.7 °
This becomes a very difficult task, however, where ordinary citizens are forced to
evaluate the mental development of a defendant in situations where reasonable
mental health professionals themselves disagree.
The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins has fundamentally changed the order in
which this inquiry will occur. By granting a categorical exemption from capital
punishment to people who are mentally retarded, the threshold question of exactly
who qualifies as "mentally retarded" now looms before the Court. Although the
actual process by which this will occur will develop cumulatively in individual
cases over
time, judges and juries will have to answer this question in a definitive
71
manner.
Presently, there are two paths the criminal justice system can take in creating a
legal threshold for mental retardation. First, the clinical definitions of mental
retardation are well established, and these definitions may be accepted wholesale.
Here, the advantages are three-fold. One advantage is that clinical definitions
already exist and are in wide circulation. Examples include definitions offered by
the AAMR; the APA in its publication, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,fourth edition (DSM-IV); and the WHO, in its publication, The
InternationalStatisticalClassificationof Diseases and Related Health Problems,
tenth revision (ICD- 10).72 A second advantage is that the scientific method is used
when conducting clinical evaluations. This is a widely accepted analytic method
and enjoys broad acceptance both by the judiciary and prospective jurors. Lastly,
the scientific research underlying clinical definitions endows these classifications
with a certain amount of legitimacy. Where dueling expert witnesses testify,
however, a court would nonetheless be faced with a credibility determination.

69. 530 U.S. 466,490 (2001). In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a priorconviction, must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. As a matter of due process, any fact that might lead
to an enhanced sentence that would increase the maximum penalty may be found by ajury using a reasonable doubt
standard.
70. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See also infra notes 72-76.
71. The Court's decision in Atkins makes clear that its holding extends to all defendants who fall within the
range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48. This
means that while states are free to adopt variations in the wording of the definition, they cannot adopt a definition
that encompasses a smaller group of defendants, nor may they fail to protect any individuals who have mental
retardation under the definition embodied in the national consensus. Both judge and jury will have significant roles
in the determination of whether a defendant is mentally retarded. See Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
72. The AAMR's definition is most widely accepted within the United States, but the WHO's definition
is most widely used internationally.
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The second path the courts may take is creating a legal definition of mental
retardation, perhaps to be determined in a separate hearing much like the modem
pre-trial competency hearings. The obvious criticism that would arise is that lawyers
and judges are endowing themselves with the ability to make psychiatric diagnoses.
This would create a problem similar to what existed when juries were allowed to
independently weigh mental retardation as a mitigating factor.
The Court in Atkins offered an analysis of the value of clinical definitions of
mental retardation when imported into the world of criminal culpability:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such
as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age
18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however,
by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely
to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that
they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that
in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their
personal culpability.73
The presentation of these clinical definitions provided the Court with objective
clinical and medical criteria that it could rely upon for its analysis of reduced legal
culpability. This language may prove to be a starting point for courts in choosing
the path ahead.
Finally, Ring v. Arizona7 4 raised additional questions as to whether the judge or
the jury makes the determination whether the defendant is mentally retarded. Ring
involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to Arizona's judge-sentencing capital
punishment scheme. Defendant Ring argued that the Sixth Amendment requires that
any finding of fact that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be
unanimously made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.7 5 While Ring dealt
specifically with statutory aggravating circumstances, it included "factfinding
necessary to put [a defendant]... to death. 76 Applying Ring, a mentally retarded
defendant is now constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty.7 7 Since mental
retardation is now a factual issue upon which a defendant's eligibility for death
turns, that
fact must be "submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
78
doubt."
While Ring would seem to put the task of determining whether a defendant is
mentally retarded into thejury' s hands, the trial judge also has a very important role

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 597 n.4.
Id. at 609.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 600.
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to play.79 In Atkins, the Court prohibited execution of the mentally retarded in part
by recognizing that retarded persons suffer in litigating issues in front of juries,
which in turn exposes them to "a special risk of wrongful execution. ' 80 Trial courts
are obligated to conduct hearings on the admission of evidence regarding the
defendant's possible mental retardation. Both the defense and the prosecution
would have the opportunity to present evidence, including expert testimony. After
considering the evidence, the court should find the defendant to be not-deatheligible if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant has
mental retardation.81 If the defendant is found to be not-death-eligible because of
mental retardation, the trial could proceed as a non-capital trial, and, if convicted,
the defendant could be sentenced to any penalty available under state law, other
than death. If, on the other hand, the court finds that the defendant is not mentally
retarded, and thus potentially eligible for the death penalty, the case could proceed
as a capital trial.8 ' Thus, both judge and jury participate in the determination of the
classification of mental retardation, in effect constructing and administering a gate
through which capital defendants must pass should the prosecution seek the death
penalty.
ILI. ADOLESCENCE, DEVELOPMENT AND CULPABILITY
A. The Social and Legal Constructionof Childhood
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in
their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. 3
Traditionally, many areas of law have recognized the unique status of children.
The common law allowed for special treatment of children in almost all areas of
law, including contracts, family law, criminal justice, and numerous other fields of
79. See generally John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles of Developing and Presenting
Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, at http://dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/janO2mentalh.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2003).
80. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (noting, (1) the difficulty a mentally retarded person may have in testifying;
(2) the possibility that a mentally retarded person's "demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of
remorse"; and (3) the possibility that the mental retardation evidence may enhance the likelihood that future
dangerousness will be found by the jury).
81. A court could decide that the prosecution would have the burden of establishing that the defendant is
not mentally retarded by a higher burden, e.g., clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. While
a higher burden may not be constitutionally requiredat this stage, it would serve to save the costs of going through
a capital trial in cases where it is likely the jury will ultimately determine, using the constitutionally required higher
standard, that the defendant is mentally retarded at step two. See Blume & Leonard, supra note 79.
82. As in Jackson, the bifurcated approach makes sense because its two prongs address two separate
(although factually related) questions. The first, to be addressed by the judge, is the legal issue of whether the
defendant is a person who is eligible for the death penalty. If the court does not find the defendant death-eligible
because of mental retardation, it would be unconstitutional to proceed with a capital trial. The second inquiry, by
the jury, is whether the prosecution has demonstrated that the defendant is factually an individual upon whom the
death penalty may be imposed. Condemning a defendant to death who has properly raised the issue of mental
retardation then becomes contingent on the finding of fact that is a necessary precondition to a capital sentence.
Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
83. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
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governmental regulation. It is nearly universal in the law to assume that children are
immature and unable to protect themselves from others and from their own mistakes
and, therefore, are in need of adult supervision.84 Their immaturity often is
accompanied by dependencies on adults for basic survival needs, such as food,
shelter, health care, and education. As Professor Elizabeth Scott shows, two
dimensions of immaturity-cognitive development and judgment-make children
incompetent to reason and make rational choices.85 Children also are assumed to be
plastic and thus vulnerable to both influence and harm from others.
These disabilities-incompetence, vulnerability, and dependency-are expressed
in several areas of legal regulation: the right to vote, consent to medical procedures,
drink alcohol, drive motor vehicles, accept employment, enter into contracts,86 join
the military, marry, and go to prison. Professor Scott points out that adolescents'
First Amendment free speech rights-that is, their access to regulated speech as
well as their rights to expression-are more limited than those of adults, in part,
because the U.S. Supreme Court assumed that children may be vulnerable to the
potentially harmful effects of some forms of speech.87 Children are subject to
curfews that would be unconstitutional for adults.88 This longstanding framework
of legal regulation of adolescence suggests that both law and policy view children
as a group whose unique traits and circumstances warrant a special protective and
regulatory scheme.
Historically, there has been no definitive age for determining when children have
attained the capacities to function as adults. Rather, externalities-changes and
developments in society-often have had an effect on raising and lowering the age
standard. That is, the assignment of age-specific competencies tends to reflect
contemporary social constructions of adolescence. Just as the context and meaning
of adolescent behaviors shift, so too do the age boundaries for the corresponding
behavior. For example, the moral panic surrounding teenage drunk driving animated
a sudden and sharp increase in the minimum legal drinking age.89 In the United

84. See generally Scott, supranote 42; FRANKLIN E.ZIMRING, CHANGINGLEGALWORLDOFADOLESCENCE

36 (1982).
85. See generally Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Constructionof Adolescence, 29 HOFsTRAL. REv. 547, 55062 (2000).
86. Minors are liable only on contracts for necessaries. Under the traditional rule, minors can disaffirm other
contracts, at their option, returning consideration in possession, but with no liability for use or damage. Under the
modern (minority) rule, minors can disaffirm but must compensate the contracting party for use or damage, unless
overreaching by the other party is involved. See SAMUEL L. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN INTHE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 101-06 (2d ed. 1997).
87. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the state can restrict children's access to obscene
material that would be protected speech for adults, and that public school officials can censor material in school
newspapers. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding New York statute restricting sale of "obscene
material" to minors); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the prior restraint of
a school newspaper).
88. Courts recognize that curfew ordinances would violate the rights of adults to move about in public but
uphold carefully tailored ordinances that are directed at juveniles. E.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F.
Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997), affd 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
89. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, "A moral panic is characterized by the feeling, held by a
substantial number of the members of a given society, that evil-doers pose a threat to the society and to the moral
order as a consequence of their behaviour and, therefore, 'something should be done' about them and their
behavior." ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE

31 (1994). Evidence of an increase in traffic accidents related to alcohol in the late 1970s created pressure on state
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States, the upward trend in the age of capacity for children has been linked to
industrialization, growing societal wealth, and an accompanying interest in
education.9" These developments together have contributed to the greater ability of
American society to invest more resources in the education and upbringing of our
youth.
The law has expressed the boundaries of childhood by setting categorical
boundaries that reflect broad and sometimes changing norms in a series of agespecific competencies. These boundaries have anticipated and balanced the social
need to integrate children into civil society with the need to protect them from
concomitant harms. This is true even though such "bright line" rules may not
exactly mirror the developmental age when children attain those functions. Scott
suggests that there is little evidence that, in most contexts, the interests of
adolescents are harmed by a regime of binary classification or a bright line
demarcating the attainment of adult competence.9 These boundaries did, though,
balance several objectives. Often, legal regulation that lowered or raised the
threshold of legal adulthood served both a broader public interest and the interest
of the adolescents who were classified as adults.92 The granting of adult
responsibility assumed that enough children had reached the threshold age to
tolerate the mistakes of the percentage who were granted the freedoms or
responsibilities but who had not yet attained the developmental capacity by that age
to perform that function well. In other words, "legal policy facilitates the transition
to adulthood through a series of bright line rules that reflect society's collective
interest in young citizen's healthy development to productive adulthood."93
B. A Brief History of the Doctrineof Diminished Culpability of Children
Establishing bright line thresholds for granting adult status and responsibility to
adolescents has worked less well in the realm of adult criminal responsibility.

legislatures to raise the legal drinking age. From September 1976 through January 1983, sixteen states raised the
legal age to 21. Then, because of more pressure in 1984, the federal government enacted the Uniform Drinking Age
Act and any states that did not raise the legal drinking age to 21 would receive reduced federal highway
construction funds. See 23 U.S.C. 158 (2000).
90. See MARY CLEMENT, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCESS (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2d
ed. 2002).
91. Professor Scott claims that the binary classification works well, regardless of whether behavior-specific
boundaries depart from the reality of developmental maturity. Sharp boundaries provide a clear signal of the
attainment of adult legal status, and by varying the age at which adult rights and duties are granted for different
functions (drinking, driving, marriage, work, military service, consent to medical procedures, entering into
contracts, freedom from curfew), adolescents transit from childhood to adulthood gradually, without creating an
intermediate category for adolescence. Scott, supra note 85, at 560-62.
92. Id. Perhaps the best counterfactual for gradualism in granting adult responsibilities is the case of
abortion. In Bellotti v. Baird,the Supreme Court required that a minor be given the opportunity (through a hearing)
to demonstrate her maturity and ability to make an autonomous decision. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Thejudicial by-pass
hearing prescribed in Bellotti v. Baird created a quasi-judicial forum for a pregnant teenager to demonstrate that
she should be allowed to make the abortion decision without involving her parents and is a central element of
abortion regulation. In that context, Professor Scott notes the burdensome procedural requirements that create social
and administrative costs involving parental notification and multiple visits, with little evidence that the welfare of
adolescents is advanced through the creation of such an intermediate category of responsibility. Scott, supra note
85, at558.
93. Scott, supra note 85, at 577.
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An examination of early English laws reveals that below a certain age threshold,

usually age seven or so, children were considered to be incapable of criminal acts

because they were incapable of forming the necessary element of criminal intent.94
Although youth was not a complete excuse for criminal acts, the young age of an
offender often provided grounds for the commutation or elimination of punishment.95 At the same time, for children aged seven and higher, there was a rebuttable
presumption of incapacity. Generally, in early American colonial history, the
burden was on the prosecution to overcome this presumption, however no exact
standard of proof ever emerged.96 Various courts over time had used differing
terminology in their attempt to measure a child's culpability, including the
following: having "a guilty knowledge,"97 "fully aware of the nature and
consequences of the act,"'98 "plainly showed intelligent malice,"99 and "mentally
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong.' '
By 1825, the first refuge was opened where children served sentences in a
separate institution from adults. ' Nonetheless, the juvenile justice system had not
yet been established and children were still processed through the adult criminal
court system. °2 Eventually, parental neglect began to be recognized as one of the
causes ofjuvenile delinquency and destitution; this discovery animated the idea that
children were to be reformed and not punished. °3
Beginning in 1899, Illinois began a nation-wide legislative movement that

established separate jurisdiction for juvenile courts. The juvenile court institutionalized into law and procedure the notion that children who broke the law lacked
the skills and maturity of adults and, therefore, rehabilitative services could restore
them toward maturity and a functional adult life."~ The new juvenile courts built
a jurisprudence and institutional structure around this new jurisprudence. 0 5 By the

94. W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OFENGLAND 23-24 (1792); M. HALE, 1 PLEAS OFTHE
CROWN 25-28 (1682).
95. See generally A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAW Q. REV. 364
(1937).
96. Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323, 327-28 (1858).
97. Watson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Ky. 1933).
98. Martin v. State, 8 So. 858 (Ala. 1891).
99. Id.
100. Miles v. State, 54 So. 946, 946 (Miss. 1911).
101. See generally DAVIDROTHMAN, CONSCIENCEAND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS; THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969).
102. ROTHMAN, supra note 101, at 10.
103. See supra note 101.
104. See e.g., Lamar Empey, The ProgressiveLegacy and the Concept of Childhood,in JUVENILE JUSTICE:
THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS 3 (Lamar Empey ed., 1979). The creation of the juvenile courts
modernized and institutionalized the notion of immaturity inherent in the infancy defense. See Andrew Walkover,
The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 510-12 (1984).
105. In separating child from adult offenders, the juvenile court system also rejected the jurisprudence and
procedure of adult criminal prosecutions. Courtroom procedures were modified to eliminate any implication of a
criminal proceeding; a euphemistic vocabulary and a physically separate court building were introduced to avoid
the stigma of adult prosecutions. To avoid stigmatizing a youth, hearings were confidential, access to court records
limited, and children were found to be delinquent rather than guilty of committing a crime. Juvenile court
proceedings concentrated on the child's background and welfare rather than the details surrounding the commission
of a specific crime. See, e.g., PLATT supra note 101. The juvenile court movement rejected the punitive regime of
the adult criminal justice system, favoring a flexible system where the court intervened paternalistically to identify
the causes of delinquency and target services to cure these problems. By rejecting the formality of the adult courts,
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time the federal government passed the Juvenile Court Act in 1938,1"6 there existed
a separate and distinct, formalized judicial forum and procedure for youthful
offenders in every state.' °7 Even after the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Gault allocated procedural rights to juveniles,0 8 including the right to counsel, the
Court narrowly defined these rights to the judicial fact-finding hearing, continued
to embrace the unique procedures for treating juveniles separately from adults, and
rejected the right to a jury trial for juveniles.' 09
Despite the juvenile court's flexibility in determining the causes of misconduct
and its individualization of punishment, some juveniles were expelled from the
juvenile court and their cases were transferred to criminal court, an act that attached
the assumption of culpability to the adolescent offender and exposed them to
criminal punishments."0 These expulsions created a categorical status of adult
culpability for those juvenile offenders. The expulsion-actually a waiver or
transfer process--offered a method for the juvenile court to decide which
adolescent offenders were sufficiently blameworthy to face adult punishment. These
juveniles were deemed culpable as adults if their characters and behaviors merited
the harsher conditions of punishment traditionally reserved for adults."'
In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed its first juvenile case." 2
Although the Kent decision preserved the waiver ofjuveniles into adult court, it also
created a different standard of procedural reliability and fairness in juvenile cases.
Kent held that children were entitled to representation by counsel, a hearing, and
access to the information upon which the wavier decision was based, including a
statement of the reasons supporting the transfer. In addition, the Kent Court set out
a series of factors that the juvenile court judge was required to consider in making

the juvenile court also made the proceedings confidential so as not to socially stigmatize young offenders, excluded
juries and lawyers from juvenile court proceedings, and rejected the rules of evidence and formal procedures for
confronting witnesses.
106. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2000). Prior to 1938, there was no federal
legislation providing for special treatment for juveniles. In 1938, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was passed
with the essential purpose of keeping juveniles apart from adult criminals. The original legislation provided
juveniles with certain important rights including the right not to be sentenced to a term beyond the age of twentyone. This early law also provided that an individual could be prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent only if the
Attorney General in his discretion so directed. The 1938 Act gave the Attorney General the option to proceed
against juvenile offenders as adults or as delinquents except with regard to those allegedly committing offenses
punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Juvenile Delinquency Act was amended in 1948, with few
substantive changes.
107. See generally STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE (1977).
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
109. Id. at 13, 22.
110. Scott, supra note 85. See also David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile
Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 13

(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Franklin Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OFJUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OFADOLESCENTS TOTHE CRIMINALCOURT 207 (Jeffrey Fagan
& Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, Editors'Introduction,in THECHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 1 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin

E. Zimring eds., 2000).
111. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1981); BARRY
C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE ANDTHETRANSFORMATION OFTHE JUVENILECOURT (1999); Tanenhaus, supra note 110;

Zirning, supra note 110; Fagan & Zimring, supra note 110.
112. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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a waiver determination: the seriousness and type of offense; the manner in which
the crime was committed; the maturity of the juvenile; the upbringing, home
situation, and lifestyle of the juvenile; his or her record and history; the possibility
of rehabilitating the youth; and concerns regarding the protection of the public." 3

Thus, the Court's initial protection of juveniles was weakened where, after
considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances, a court was nonetheless
allowed to subject juveniles to the very same punishments as adults.
Following Kent, nearly every state has either lowered the age at which juveniles
can be transferred to the juvenile court, redistributed discretion to effect such
waivers or transfers fromjudge to prosecutors on a case-by-case basis" l4 (or to legislatures via statutory exclusion)," 5 or pursued both paths to criminalizing delinquency. Under current statutes, the states assign criminal liability to wrongdoing at
no more than age eighteen, and most mark the age of responsibility at even younger
ages for specific crimes."' For some offenses and offenders, the threshold drops as

low as thirteen years of age in New York and fourteen in California. '
The categorical status ofjuveniles as culpable adults obscures the developmental
realities of adolescence. Many commentators have noted the difficulty and social
costs of this interstitial regime and suggested a range of alternative standards and
strategies for conferring adult responsibility on adolescents who violate the criminal

law." 8 But the reality of these laws is to expose a broad range of juveniles ages
sixteen and above to the option of capital punishment in cases of homicide.
C. Jurisprudenceof the Juvenile Death Penalty
Executions of youths below the age of eighteen, in (what eventually became) the
United States, were recorded in the earliest colonial times." 9 The number of

113. Id. at 566-67.
114. See Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice,in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 45 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring
eds., 2000). See also Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof the Offense: Legislative Changes
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473-78 (1987).
115. See Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile CourtJurisdiction:A History and
Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT

83 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zinming eds., 2000).
116. See id.
117. For example, the New York Juvenile Offender Law, enacted in 1978, mandates that 14 and 15 year olds
indicted for any one of 15 felony offenses-"JO eligible offenses"-and 13 year olds indicted for homicide are
excluded from family court and processed in criminal court. See Merrill Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act:
Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 677 (1981). See also
CAL. WELF & INST. § 707(a)(2) (2003) (expanding the list of serious charges that will "automatically transfer" a
juvenile who is over 14 years old to criminal court). Moreover, Section 18 lowers the age requirement for automatic
transfers from 16 to 14, further increasing the number ofjuveniles who will be transferred to criminal court without
any judicial determination. This expansion ultimately shifts the power to determine which court will judge an
accused from the judge to the prosecutor, who has the unreviewable discretion to select the charge. For example,
if the prosecutor charges manslaughter, the juvenile stays in the juvenile justice system; if the prosecution charges
murder, the same conduct gets tried in criminal court.
118. Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan, TransferPolicy andLaw Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 407, 408-13 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zimring eds., 2000). See also Scott, supra note 85, at 581-86.
119. See ROBERT D. HALE, A REVIEW OF JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1997). The first recorded
execution of a juvenile (below age 18 at the time of execution) was in 1642, by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.The
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executions remained very low until the resumption of executions following
Furman12 in 1973. By 2002, at least 365 individuals in the United States had been
executed for crimes they committed when they were juveniles, dating back to the
first execution in 1642.121 Twenty-one of these 365 executions for juvenile crimes
have been carried out during the current era (1973-2002), 2.6 percent of the total
of 820 executions during this period. 22 Almost two-thirds of the recent executions
ofjuvenile offenders have occurred in Texas, with no otherjurisdiction in the world
actively involved in this practice. 2 3 A total of 224 juvenile death sentences have
been imposed since 1973, with Texas, Florida, and Alabama accounting for half of
them. 124 Of these, eighty remain currently in force and are still being litigated.125 Of
the other 144 sentences finally resolved, twenty-one (fifteen percent) have resulted
126
in execution and 123 (eighty-five percent) have been reversed or commuted.
Among the thirty-eight death penalty states, nineteen set the minimum age at sixteen
years, six at age seventeen, and thirteen set the age at eighteen. Since the 1989
Stanford decision, five states have legislatively or by case law raised or established
the minimum age at eighteen. 27 No state since Stanford has lowered the age of
execution from eighteen to seventeen, although Stanford allowed states to do so.
In practice, the execution of juveniles is either formally prohibited or a rare
occurrence,1 28 a pattern acknowledging that young offenders are not fully responsible for their crimes, at least not to the extent of deserving the ultimate

last occurred in 1957. Between those dates, 331 juveniles were executed. Juvenile executions reached
unprecedented high numbers in the fifty years immediately following the Civil War.
120. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). By 1967, the federal courts had imposed a prohibition on
capital punishment so that a series of challenges to the principles and procedures could be decided. In Furman,the
court ruled that state laws that delegated to the jury the choice of execution or imprisonment for specific crimes
without any clear guidelines were unconstitutional. States began passing laws that complied with Furman in 1973,
culminating in the decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which found that a jurisprudence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the commission of murders as weighed by the jury was an acceptable
structure for guiding a jury in the choice of death or imprisonment. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 8, 9 (2003).
121. Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile
Crimes,January), 1973-June30,2002, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm (last visited Sept.
24, 2003).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. In 2002, Indiana became the most recent state to raise the minimum age for death penalty eligibility to
eighteen. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-3, 3(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2002); 2002 IND. PUB. L. 117-2002, § 1.
Montana also legislatively raised the minimum age for the death penalty. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2)
(1997); 1999 MONT. LAWS, ch. 523. Two other states, Kansas and New York, have done so by newly reinstating
the death penalty, but only for those offenders who were 18 or older at the time of their offense. See KAN. CRIM.
CODE ANN. § 21-46622 (Vernon 2001) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney 2002). The Washington
Supreme Court has also held that its death penalty statute cannot be construed to authorize imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by juvenile offenders. See Washington v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102-03 (Wash.
1993).
128. Id. See discussion of state statutes regulatingjuvenile death penalty in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). It is interesting to note that only a handful of other
countries authorize the execution of juveniles.
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punishment.129 The constitutionality of such a penalty, however, has come before
the Supreme Court several times in recent years, most notably in the 1980s in
Eddings v. Oklahoma,3 ' Thompson v. Oklahoma, 3 ' and Stanford v. Kentucky.'3 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has not revisited this question since Stanford and the
constitutionality of applying the death penalty to juvenile offenders appears to be
settled.
Using Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, arguments were made in Eddings,
Thompson, and Stanford that, given the reduced culpability and capacity of
juveniles, their execution was unconstitutionally harsh under the Cruel and Unusual
Clause. In his plurality opinion in Thompson, Justice Stevens focused on the
immaturejudgment of adolescents in explaining why juvenile executions violate the
principle of proportionality under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment:
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis of this conclusion is too
obvious to require extensive explanation. Inexperience, less intelligence and less
education make a teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons that juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.'33
In deciding Eighth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court applies a three part test
and requires that (a) the original framers of the Constitution understood the
punishment to be cruel and unusual, (b) a societal consensus exists that the
punishment offends civilized standards of human decency, and (c) the punishment
is either (i) grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or (ii) makes no
measurable contribution to the accepted goals of punishment.'34 This claim about
the harshness of the death penalty forjuveniles is a proportionality claim: juveniles
(and mentally retarded persons) should be exempted from execution because they
categorically lack the degree of culpability necessary for the courts to invoke the

129. For a brief period in the early twentieth century in the United States, social and legal responses to
homicides committed by adolescents were dramatically different compared to the contemporary American
landscape of automatic transfer to the criminal court for adolescents charged with homicide and eligible for capital
punishment at age 16. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (2000). Historical research by
Professors David Tanenhaus and Steven Drizin revealed that sixty juvenile homicide offenders in Chicago from
1900 to 1930 were exonerated by the Coroner's Jury. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the
Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 641, 653 (2002). The vast majority of these cases (52, or 83 percent) involved either a child or
adolescent shooting somebody "accidentally" with a handgun. In verdicts, the coroner's juries often voiced their

concerns about the availability of guns. Id. at 654. Tanenhaus and Drizin quote criticisms of the early twentieth
century social reformer Jane Addams of the easy availability of guns as a reaction to the frequency ofjuvenile gun
homicides: "[tihere is an entire series of difficulties directly traceable to the foolish and adventurous persistence

of carrying loaded firearms,... this tale could be duplicated almost every morning; what might be merely a boyish
scrap is turned into tragedy because some boy has a revolver." Id. at 653.
130. 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131.

487 U.S. 815 (1988).

132. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
133. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
134. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Coker, 433 U.S. 584; Enmund, 458 U.S. 782.
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ultimate sanction according to contemporary community standards. 135 That is, the
Court's jurisprudence beginning with Furman relied on a narrowing requirement
that justified the imposition of a death penalty on a defendant based on his or her
culpability relative to others found guilty of murder.' 36 In the cases below, the
threads of this proportionality argument are briefly examined.
1. Eddings v. Oklahoma
Monty Lee Eddings was sixteen-years old when he was found guilty of the firstdegree murder of an Oklahoma Highway Patrolman. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the
Court initially granted certiorari on the sole question of whether the execution of
a child who was sixteen at the time of the crime constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.'

An "eleventh hour claim" was

presented to the Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioner, asking whether the
Court should review the trial court's refusal to consider mitigating evidence-a
practice that violated the holding in Lockett v. Ohio.138 This "eleventh hour claim"
ultimately formed the basis for the decision, attracting the five votes necessary to
reverse and remand Eddings' death sentence. '3 Thus, the Court avoided deciding
the substantive age issue by vacating the defendant's death sentence on procedural
grounds. Further, Justice O'Connor's separate concurring opinion distinctly stated
that the Eddingsdecision was not intended to resolve whether the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles is a constitutional practice. The language in Eddings,
however, has become significant as the Court instructed that the chronological age
of a juvenile offender is an important factor that must be considered in death
penalty cases.' 40 After a few years, the Court returned to the specific issue of the

constitutionality.

135. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, ABA 's Proposed Moratorium: Defending Categorical Exemptions to
the Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA 's Resolutions Concerning the Execution of Juveniles and Persons with
Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 91 (1998).
136. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), for example, the Court used its ability to regulate the administration of the death penalty to narrow its use
to those cases where the circumstances warrant such a severe punishment. In effect, the Court created a category
of criminals that were so beyond rehabilitation and humanity that the only appropriate punishment would be that
which is final and severe while also bolstering the illusion of a system of heightened procedural scrutiny so that
the public can be assured that only criminals who truly deserve the death penalty will be subject to it. See Woodson,
428 U.S. at 305.
137. Eddings, 455 U.S. 104.
138. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Lockett argued that the statute was unconstitutional due to the
fact that it did not allow the sentencing judge to consider mitigating factors in capital cases, as required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The decision was seven and one-half to one-half. Chief Justice Burger
announced the opinion of the Court, concurrences were by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, Justice Rehnquist in
part concurred and in part dissented, and Justice Brennan opted not to participate. The Court also noted that a law
that prohibits one from considering mitigating factors creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed, when
in fact the crime may call for a lesser penalty. '"The Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type of
individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
139. Eddings, 455 U.S. 104.
140. The Court concluded that "[y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than
adults." Id. at 115-16.
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2. Thompson v. Oklahoma
After a few years, the Court returned to the specific issue of the constitutionality
in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 4' In Thompson, a plurality of the Supreme Court held
that imposing the death penalty on a defendant who was fifteen-years old at the time
of his crime was unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment. At fifteen, William Wayne Thompson participated in the
murder of his brother-in-law, who had a history of abusing the boy's sister. In a
five-to-three decision, the Court vacated Thompson's death sentence. Relying on
the positions taken by professional organizations and foreign nations, the majority
found that "it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who
was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense." As evidence of
changing societal attitudes, the Court noted that since the 1940s, juries infrequently
imposed the death penalty on young offenders, stating, "The road we have traveled
during the past four decades-in which thousands of juries have tried murder
cases-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty
on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the consciousness of the
community."142
Reviewing American case history and an array of social scientific literature, the
Court documented the special treatment of children in the legal system. The Court
identified several different areas where the law treats juveniles differently from
adults, areas including the right to vote, right to serve on a jury, right to drive, right
to marry, right to purchase pornographic materials, and the right to participate in
legalized gambling.'4 3 Social science research cited in the opinion's notes further
elaborated upon the characteristics of adolescence that contribute directly to the
reduced culpability of juvenile offenders. Note 43 in Thompson cited numerous
sources that demonstrate the reduced developmental abilities of children.144
The majority in Thompson also revived the discussion of the twin goals of the
death penalty elaborated upon in Gregg v. Georgia:retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by future offenders.' 4 5 The Court rejected both the retribution and
deterrence rationale in Thompson. With regard to the retribution goal, the Court
instructed that "[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's
capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children, the
retributive value component of the Eighth Amendment is simply inapplicable to the
execution of a fifteen year old offender."'' 46 Relying on the three-part test, the
majority in Thompson held that the execution of individuals who were minors at the
47
time of their crime is cruel and unusual punishment.
The impact of the Thompson decision was restricted, however, by the fact that
only fourjustices reached the conclusion that the execution of a fifteen year old was

141. 487 U.S. 815 (decision announced by Stevens, J., andjoined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.,
with O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
142. Id. at 832.
143. Id. at 823.
144. Id. at 835 n.43.
145. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
146. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-37.
147. Id. at 815.
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unconstitutional. Again, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion that
stopped short of recognizing a national consensus opposing the execution of
juveniles. Instead, Justice O'Connor vacated the sentence on the grounds that there
was a considerable risk that the Oklahoma legislature did not consider the
possibility that its death penalty statute would apply to a death-eligible fifteen-yearold.'48 Thus, the practical effect of Thompson was that the execution of a juvenile
who had committed the crime prior to age sixteen was unconstitutional unless the
state had proscribed a minimum age limit in its death penalty legislation.
3. Stanford v. Kentucky
One year later, the Court confronted a similar issue in Stanford v. Kentucky and
Wilkins v. Missouri; in these cases, however, the defendants were sixteen and
49
seventeen, respectively, when they committed their crimes. ' Stanford involved the
rape, sodomy, and shooting murder of a twenty-year-old gas station attendant by
petitioner Kevin Stanford when he was seventeen years and four months old.
Wilkins involved the stabbing death of a convenience store worker during the
commission of a robbery by Heath Wilkins when he was approximately sixteen
years and six months of age. In these decisions, the Court expressly held that the
imposition of the death penalty on defendants aged sixteen or seventeen at the
commission of their crime was not unconstitutional.
In deciding the case, Justice Scalia reviewed each of the arguments set forth in
Thompson. Rejecting the international comparisons made in Thompson, the majority
15
emphasized, "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive."' The
petitioners
Court reviewed past and current legislative developments and found the
in both cases did not meet their burden to establish an adequate basis to find a
national consensus against the juvenile death penalty. In response to the majority's
argument in Thompson-that the behavior of juries indicated disapproval of the
execution of children-the majority in Stanford held that the infrequent application
of capital punishment is indicative of the prosecutors' and juries' beliefs that capital
punishment should rarely be imposed, not never.
As a final point, the Court held that there was no basis for comparison between
the imposition of capital punishment on juveniles and laws regulating other realms
of juvenile legal responsibility. Citing Lockett v. Ohio, 5 ' the Court explained,
It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive
carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature
enough to understand that murdering another human being is profoundly wrong,
and to conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all civilized
standards.. .These laws set the appropriate ages for the operation of a system
that makes its determination in gross, and that does not conduct individualized
maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal justice system,

148.
149.
announced
150.
151.

Id. at 857.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Stanford's and Wilkins' cases were consolidated) (decision
by Scalia, J., and joined by Rehnquist, White, O'Connor & Kennedy, J.J.).
d.at369n.1.
438 U.S. at 605.
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however, does provide individualized testing. In the realm of capital punishment
in particular, "individualized consideration is a constitutional requirement."' 52
Accordingly, in Stanford, the majority relied upon the procedural safeguards
developed through the thread of death penalty jurisprudence following Furman to
protect defendants from the arbitrary and discriminatory application of capital
punishment. The Stanford Court argued that the capacity determination regarding
adolescents and deterrence had already been completed, and thus all other
constitutional claims related to capacity had been addressed. 53
' In other words, those
less culpable were filtered out earlier in the course of trial and hence were not
exposed to the possibility of a death sentence at the lower standard of blameworthiness. The danger in this approach is that the role of procedural due process
is conflated with the deliberation required for substantive factual determinations
such as maturity or culpability, and the result would be an incomplete examination
of the substantive constitutional issues underlying the application of the death
penalty on juveniles. The mere fact that procedural due process was met does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the substantive issues have been settled.
Although the Thompson and Stanford Courts recognized that children are
incomplete decision makers, judgmentally immature and unable to fully regulate all
of their behavior, the precedent in Stanford is based heavily on procedural
dimensions, not substantive considerations about the capacities or blameworthiness
of juveniles at any age. This perspective sustains today's climate that permits capital
punishment of children ages sixteen or seventeen. However, Atkins creates a
competing precedent that opposes the imposition of capital punishment when
defendants have diminished culpability, a return to the jurisprudential perspective
that places primacy on substantive considerations of reduced culpability, capacity,
and understanding.
D. Rethinking Culpabilityof Juveniles
In much of criminal law doctrine, punishment determinations require a
measurement of the wrong that is done and the blameworthiness of the individual.'54
152. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
153. Id.at 378-79.
154. See generally ROBERT NOZIK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1996); RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw (1997). In his chapter

"Retributive Punishment," Nozick articulates a formulaic approach for establishing proportionality of punishment
in a retributivist society. His basic algorithm is that P (punishment) = r (responsibility) * H (wrongness of act). For
example, under retributive punishment for S's act A: (1)Someone believes that S's act A has a certain degree of
wrongness; (2) and visits a penalty upon S; (3) which is determined by the wrongness H of the act A, or by r * H;
(4) intending that the penalty be done because of the wrong act A; (5) and in virtue of the wrongness of the act A;
(6) intending that S know the penalty was visited upon him because he did A; (7) and in virtue of the wrongness
of A; (8) by someone who intended to have the penalty fit and be done because of the wrongness of A; (9) and who
intended that S would recognize (he was intended to recognize) that the penalty was visited upon him so that 1-8
are satisfied, indeed so that 1-9 are satisfied.
Nozick extends this doctrine in several ways. First, he points out that in many cases a wrongdoer's
punishment includes other costs (compensating the victim, confronting wrongness of his act, etc)-these are
proxied by c. In this case, P = (r * H) - c. Second, Nozick points to the teleological notions of retributivism that aim
at "matching punishment." This rests on the notion that punishment should aim to inform or alert S of the
wrongness of A. This is an "optimistic hypothesis about what another person will or can come to know" and
suggests a major problem when S is incapable of learning or realizing that his act was wrong to the same r that an
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Common law assumes that children are immature, and because of that immaturity,

they are less blameworthy than adults, so the punishments for their crimes should
be proportionately less than those for a fully competent adult.'55 Distinguishing the
immature adolescent from the mature offender who is fully responsible for his or
her crimes requires a careful examination of the developmental capacities and
processes that are relevant to both adolescent criminal choices and the ways in
which immaturity mitigates responsibility.' 56
The most critical difference between adolescents and adults, whether in crime or
in choices involving everyday social or personal behaviors, is that teenagers are less
' Theirjudgment is immature because they
competent decision makers than adults. 57

have not yet attained several dimensions of psychosocial development that
characterize adults as mature, including the capacity for autonomous choice, selfmanagement, risk perception, and the calculation of future consequences.' 5 8 The
attainment of these developmental capacities is perhaps one reason why crime rates
subsequently decline as adolescent development
peak in late adolescence but
1 59
progresses toward maturity.
Notwithstanding the fact that different adolescents develop at different rates,
adolescence, generally, serves as a bridge between childhood and adulthood with

regard to developing psychosocial capacity. For example, cognitive capacities for
reasoning and understanding are well formed by mid-adolescence and approximate

average person would. Juveniles and mentally defective individuals are arguably susceptible to this effect. Third,
capital punishment generally should be reserved for those truly monstrous cases (he mentions Hitler) because if
we are to be connected to S's value (the value of the wrongness of his act and the attempt to show him its
significance through punishment), killing S would nullify any attempt at matching punishment. Finally, he touches
briefly on defining r and H, specifically. He reaches no concrete conclusions in this regard but does illustrate the
need to have them defined by separate and distinct characteristics, so as to avoid circularity. Indeed, it is often
difficult to separate the seriousness of the offense (H) and the responsibility (r) that the perpetrator should have with
regard to it. Most importantly Nozick contends that r is best defined as the degree to which S flouts correct values,
and that if defects in character contribute to this flouting, there is less flouting than there appeared to be, and r is
consequentially decreased.
Nozick's framework illustrates that punishment is (or ought to be) a product of harm and culpability,
the latter being vulnerable to mitigating factors associated with being a juvenile, a mentally retarded individual,
or another person whose disabilities constitute a cascade of mitigators in the jurisprudence of capital punishment.
If the goal of this jurisprudence is to "ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death," (as Justice
Stevens declared again in Atkins), then even a slightly mitigated r value should bring the punishment (P) under this
threshold.
155. See Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality
for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON TRIAL (R. Schwartz
& T. Grisso eds., 2000).
156. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 800 (2002). See also
Jeffrey Fagan, Contextand CulpabilityofAdolescent Violence, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 507, 535-38 (discussing
how choices to engage in or reject criminal activity in specific event circumstances are proscribed by the immediate
contexts in which the choice is made, and how those choices differ for adolescents in high versus low crime
neighborhoods).
157. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 221, 229-35 (1995) (describing developmental factors that contribute to immature judgment);
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity ofJudgment in Adolescent DecisionMaking, 20 LAw&HuM.
BEHAV. 249 (1996) (describing domains of psychosocial development as autonomy, perspective, and temperance).
158. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157.
159. See Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, UnderstandingDesistancefrom Crime, 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE
1, 46-48 (2001) (reviewing literature on the robust finding that crime peaks in late adolescence and declines for
most persons sharply during developmental transitions from adolescence to adulthood).
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the skills shown by most adults. " But teens are less able to use these skills to make
real-life decisions.' 6' Adolescents also mature more slowly in other areas that
contribute to immature judgment and the tendency of adolescents to make choices
that are harmful to themselves or others.'6 2 Finally, adolescence is characterized by
incomplete identity formation, a process that, when mixed with poor judgment and
decision making, leads to exploration, behavioral experimentation, and fluctuations
in self-image.'6 3 As psychologist Laurence Steinberg shows, "This movement, over
the course of adolescence, from a fluid and embryonic sense of identity to one that
is more stable and well-developed is paralleled by developments in the realms of
morality, values, and beliefs." 6 That these three dimensions of development render
most adolescents immature-and therefore less than fully culpable for their
behaviors, whether they be criminal or conventional-reflects striking parallels with
the incompetencies of mentally retarded persons that should be obvious.
1. Understanding and Reasoning
Cognitive development-reasoning and understanding-among adolescents
differs substantially from adults. Basic skills, such as information processing,
attention, short and long-term memory, and organization are acquired steadily
through adolescence. 6' 5 Although social science evidence suggests that adolescents'
capacities for understanding and reasoning in making decisions roughly
approximate those of adults by mid-adolescence, most of the research leading to
these conclusions was done in unstressful and decontextualized laboratory
situations. 66
' It is uncertain whether these results would be obtained in ambiguous
situations or be the same under arousal in unstructured settings where peer
dynamics have a strong influence on adolescent choices. Scott and Steinberg
conclude that the empirical evidence is uncertain whether adolescent cognitive
capacity67 as it affects choices relevant to criminal conduct is comparable to that of
adults. 1
2. Judgment Factors in Decision Making
Even when adolescent cognitive capacities approximate the levels of adults, other
developmental dimensions that progress more slowly lead to immature judgment

160. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157.
161. See S. Ward & W. Overton, Semantic Familiarity, Relevance, and the Development of Deductive
Reasoning, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 26, 488-93 (1990).
162. See Scott et al., supra note 157; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence:
A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 165-66 (1997).
163. See LAURENCE D. STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE (6th ed. 2002).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Daniel P. Keating, Adolescent Thinking, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING
ADOLESCENT 54 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990).
166. The claim is tentative because it is supported by a group of small research studies conducted in
laboratory settings that for the most part involved white middle class subjects and no adult control groups. Tasks
often are artifactual and are not performed under conditions of stress or arousal that are typical of the situations
in which adolescents often find themselves when they must decide to engage in a criminal act. Scott & Steinberg,
supra note 156, at 813-14. See also William Gardner, Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and
Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895 (1989). See also Fagan, supra note 156.
167. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156.

Spring 2003]

JUVENILES AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

and poor decision making. The psychosocial factors most relevant to differences in
judgment include (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk,
(c) temporal perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management. 6 "Whereas cognitive capacities shape the process of decision-making, immature judgment can affect
outcomes, because these developmental factors influence adolescent values and
169
preferences, that in turn drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices."'
Parents and developmental psychologists have both long known that adolescents
are more responsive to peer influence than are adults, that these influences are
greatest in mid-adolescence, and that these influences decline slowly during the
high school years. 70 Peer influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and
indirectly. In some contexts, adolescents might make choices in response to direct
peer pressure. Adolescents' desire for peer approval affects their choices, even
without direct coercion. Future orientation is the extent to which individuals
consider both long-term and short-term consequences of their actions in making
choices. Compared to adults, adolescents tend to telescope the future, placing it
farther into the background of decision making than do adults, while at the same
time disproportionately weighing the short-term consequences of decisions-both
risks and benefits-in making choices. 7 '
Adolescents also perceive and weigh risk differently from adults.'7 2 Adolescents
take more risks with health and safety than do older adults, such as unprotected
sex,173 drunk driving, 74
' and other questionable behaviors.175 Peer influence interacts
with risk taking: empirical evidence shows that people generally make riskier
decisions in groups than they do alone. 175 Adolescents seem to be less risk averse
than adults because they overstate rewards while underestimating risks. 1

168. See id.; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157.
169. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156.
170. B. Bradford Brown, Peer Groups and Peer Cultures, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING
ADOLESCENT 171 (S.Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990).
171. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156 (citing William Gardner &
Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS INTHE AIDS
EPIDEMIC 24 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990). Scott and Steinberg cite several explanations for this age gap in
future orientation.
First, owing to cognitive limitations in their ability to think in hypothetical terms, adolescents
simply may be less able than adults to think about events that have not yet occurred (i.e., events
that may occur sometime in the future). Second, weaker future orientation of adolescents may
reflect their more limited life experience. For adolescents, a consequence five years off may
seem very remote; they may simply attach more weight to short term consequences because they
seem more salient to their lives. How far out in time individuals are able to project events may
be proportionate to their age; ten years represents one-fifth of the lifespan for someone who is
50, but two-thirds for someone who is 15.
William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-ChoiceTheory ofRisk Taking, in ADOLESCENT RISKTAKING 78-79 (Nancy
J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993).
172. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-MakingPerspective,
12 DEELOPMENTALREV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (presenting a rational decision-making model of adolescent risky behavior).
173. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, supranote 171.
174. Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 172.
175. See, e.g., Alida Benthin et al., Adolescent Health-Threatening and Health-EnhancingBehaviors: A
Study of Word Association, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
176. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156.
177. Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 157. Scott and Steinberg note that this may relate in part to limits
on youthful time perspective; taking risks is more costly for those with a stake in the future. Finally, adolescents
may have different values and goals than do adults that lead them to calculate risks and rewards differently. For
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Impulsivity and poor self-management also appear to be greater in adolescents
than in adults. Impulsivity increases between middle adolescence and early
adulthood and declines thereafter, as does sensation-seeking.' 78 Emotional regulation also is more erratic among adolescents than adults,'79 and adolescents may have
more difficulty regulating their moods, impulses, and behaviors than do adults.'80
Some of the differences between adults and adolescents may reflect not just
psychosocial development, but also its underlying organic structure. The disjuncture
between physical maturity and uneven maturity in different parts of the brain that
regulate different functions creates an imbalance in adolescents that can adversely
influence theirjudgment and decision making. Scott and Steinberg summarize this
process as it pertains to this developing area of research:
At puberty, changes in the limbic system B, a part of the brain that is central in
the processing and regulation of emotion B, may stimulate adolescents to seek
higher levels of novelty and to take more risks; and may contribute to increased
emotionality and vulnerability to stress. At the same time, patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision-making, suggest that these higherorder cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle adolescence. One
scientist has likened the psychological consequences of brain development in
adolescence to "starting the engines without a skilled driver."''
Recent studies suggest that there are functions and regions of the brain regulating
long-term planning, regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of
risk and reward, and these functions and regions continue to mature over the course
of adolescence, and perhaps beyond age twenty and well into young adulthood.' 82
Functional brain imaging and postmortem studies suggest that frontal lobes do not

example, the dangerof risk taking could constitute areward for an adolescent but a cost toan adult. Moreover, peer
rejection is likely to be weighed more heavily in adolescent than adult choices. For instance, whereas an adult might
simply weigh the pleasant effects of experimenting with an illicit drug against criminal apprehension or potential
health risks, an adolescent might weigh the peer acceptance or rejection that might result from the choice. See also
L.L.Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 255
(1987).
178. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157.
179. Research on brain development indicates that the organic bases of functions such as long-term planning,
regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward are not fully mature by the end of
adolescence. See Patricia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417 (2000) (reviewing animal and human research on brain maturation
during puberty and indicating that "remodelling of the brain" during adolescence occurs among different species)
(cited in Scott & Steinberg, supranote 156 n.71).
180. See, e.g., Reed Larson et al., Mood Variability and the Psycho-SocialAdjustment of Adolescents, 9 J.
YOUTH& ADOLESCENCE 469, 488 (1980) (presenting a study finding wider mood fluctuations among adolescents
than adults) (cited in Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156 n.70).
181. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156 (citing Ronald Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and
Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60 (2001)).
182. Spear, supra note 179; see also Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A LongitudinalMRIStudy, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861,861-63 (1999); Judith L. Rapoport et al.,
ProgressiveCorticalChangeDuring Adolescence in Childhood-OnsetSchizophrenia.A LongitudinalMagnetic
Resonance Imaging Study, 56 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 649, 652-54 (1999); Paul M. Thompson et al.,
Growth Patternsin the Developing Brain Detectedby Using ContinuumMechanical TensorMaps, 404 NATURE
190-93 (2000); Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
SCIENCE 851, 851-54 (2002).
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fully mature until young adulthood. 8 3 This study compared magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scans of young adults, twenty-three to thirty, with those of teens,
twelve to sixteen. The researchers looked for signs of myelin, which would imply
more mature, efficient neural connections. Areas of the frontal lobe showed the
largest differences between young adults and teens. This increased myelination in
the adult frontal cortex likely relates to the maturation of cognitive processing and
other "executive" functions. Many other areas-those that mediate spatial, sensory,
auditory, and language functions-already seemed mature in the teen brain. Instead,
the observed late maturation of the frontal lobe is characteristic of impaired
"executive" functioning. 8 4
Another series of MRI studies suggests that teens may process emotions differently than adults.' 85 Researchers at Harvard's McLean Hospital scanned subjects'
brain activity while they identified emotions on pictures of faces displayed on a
computer screen. 86
' Young teens (below fourteen), who characteristically perform
poorly on the task, activated the amygdala, a brain center that mediates fear and
other "gut" reactions, more than the frontal lobe. As teens grow older, their brain
activity during this task tends to shift to the frontal lobe, leading to more reasoned
perceptions and improved performance.' 8 7 Similarly, as teens got older, the
researchers saw a shift in activation from the temporal lobe to the frontal lobe
during a language skills task. The studies were imprecise as to a bright line threshold when frontal lobe activity dominated cognitive and emotional tasks, but the
researchers did note significant variability in the age at which these functional
thresholds are achieved: some teens reach this stage of "mature" (frontal lobe)
functioning at fourteen, while many others have not yet reached it by age twenty or
later into young adult years.' 88
Professor Ruben Gur concludes that brain maturation is not complete until about
age twenty-one, with large variations in myelination in different regions of the
brain, a marker of uneven maturation in areas associated with cognitive and
emotional function.'89 Based on a review of experimental studies and both brain
imaging and MRI analyses, Professor Gur explicitly links these brain regions to the
control of aggression and other impulses, the consideration of alternatives and
consequences of actions, impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight
of consequences, and other "mature thought processes" that make people morally

183. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-adolescentBrain Maturation in Frontaland
StriatalRegions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE, 851 (1999).
184. Id.
185. National Institute of Mental Health, Teen Brain: A Work in Progress,at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
publicat/teenbrain.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
186. A.A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of FacialAffect Recognition in Children
and Adolescents, 32 J. AM. ACADEMY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195 (1999).
187. Id.
188. In a recent television broadcast, Dr. Jay Giedd, of the National Institute of Mental Health, stated that
"it's sort of unfair to expect [adolescents] to have adult levels of organizational skills or decision making before
the brain is finished being built." Frontline, Inside the Teen Brain, (Jan. 31, 2002), at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/teenbrain/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
189. See, e.g., Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 9 (claiming that maturation of association cortex is not
complete "even by late adolescence" and that, within this cortex the prefrontal regions are last to mature, and that
myelination is usually not complete until ages 20-22).
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culpable.' 90 Professor Gur concludes that there is no way to state with any scientific
reliability that an individual seventeen year old has a fully matured brain, regardless
of the precision of other psychosocial assessments at that age.' 9'
This is a new and rapidly developing research area, where natural science
complements evidence from behavioral science regarding deficits and incompetencies in adolescents that influence judgment, decision making, and emotional
regulation. The implication, then, is that there exists uneven development within the
adolescent brain regarding various functions, and this irregularity is also subject to
significant variation among adolescents in the age at which they attain organic brain
developmental thresholds that regulate the emotional and cognitive components of
decision making and control. This variation suggests that even at later stages of
adolescence, and perhaps among some young adults, there is a non-negligible
percentage of people who are "immature" not just in their psychosocial functioning
but in the organic development that underlies it.
3. Development and Decision Making
192
The tendency of adolescents to commit crimes in groups is well known,
although the mechanisms of group dynamics and peer influence are not well
understood. 193 Changes in peer networks over time, and a diminution of the role of
peers in both legal and antisocial behavior, also characterize the predictable patterns
of desistance from crime that occurs during the transition from adolescence to
adulthood.194 Scott and Steinberg conclude that the research on peer influence, risk
preference, impulsivity, and future orientation shows that these factors affect
adolescent decision making, in general, and are equally likely to influence decisions
to participate in crime.'95
Research on the social contexts of adolescent interactions shows that these group
settings offer strong incentives for conformity and compliance, serving important
developmental functions such as the expression of autonomy and the construction
of social identity. 196 Opportunities for crime are more abundant in settings where
social controls are weak, whether in the everyday world of adolescents or the
unique and stressful settings of inner cities where crime rates are highest.' 97
Adolescent peer orientation makes youths who live in high-crime neighborhoods

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Albert Reiss, Jr. & David Farrington, Advancing Knowledge about Co-offending: Results from a
Prospective LongitudinalSurvey of London Males, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1991).
193. See PATRICIA ADLER & PETER ADLER, PEER POWER (1999).
194. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON& JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING (1993); Robert J. Sampson & John

H. Laub, Understanding Desistancefrom Crime, 28 CRIM. & JUST. 1, 46-48 (2001); Edward Mulvey & John La
Rosa, Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent Development, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212, 231 (1986).
195.

See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156.

196. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna Wilkinson, The Social Contexts and Developmental Functions of
Adolescent Violence, in VIOLENCE INAMERICAN SCHOOLS 89 (B. Hamburg et al. eds., 1998).
197. See, e.g., ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR., & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE

DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL (1993); Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented
Epidemic in Youth Violence, in YOUTH VIOLENCE (Michael H. Tonry & Mark Harrison Moore eds., 1998); Robert
J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Individual and Community Factors in Violent Offending and Victimization, in 3
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (A. Reiss & J. Roth eds., 1994).
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susceptible to powerful pressures to join in criminal activity, and compliance may
be both typical and perceived as necessary to avoid threats to an adolescent's
personal safety.' 98
In my studies on inner city violence in New York, I showed how social norms
within urban adolescent male subcultures prescribe a set of attitudes and behaviors
that often lead to violent crime. 99 Avoiding confrontation when challenged by a
rival results in a loss of social status and ostracism by peer affiliates, which itself
can create vulnerability to physical attack. Ordinary youths in poor urban
neighborhoods face coercive peer pressure and sometimes tangible threats that both
propel them to get involved in crime and make extrication difficult. Their limited
ability to see beyond their immediate social and physical world to the norms and
institutions of the dominant society reflects not only their attenuated psychosocial
development and decision-making skills, but the influence of their social context as
well.2°
For most adolescents, these characteristic developmental influences on decision
making will change in predictable ways as they mature. During the maturational
journey to adulthood, adolescents become better decision makers as they grow out
of their natural susceptibility to peer influence, their risk perception improves, their
computation of risk becomes more balanced and longer in temporal perspective, and
self-regulation evolves. 2 1' These changes lead to changes in the calculus, and
competency, of decision making.20 2 "The adolescent becomes an adult who is likely
to make different choices from his youthful self, choices that reflect more mature
judgment., 213 Imagine, then, the mentally retarded person who cannot mature in this
fashion and develop these competencies, and the basis for extending the logic of
Atkins to adolescents becomes transparent.
E. Development and the Jurisprudenceof Culpabilityfor Adolescents
The principle of penal proportionality leads to a determination of punishment that
combines the degree of harm of the act and the blameworthiness of the actor. 0 4
Determining blameworthiness, whether in absolute or relative terms, is a process
that draws strength notjust from normative or moral views, but from more complex
and nuanced judgments about exogenous factors that bear on culpability-both

198. Fagan, supra note 156, at 535-38; Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and Social
Identity, in YOUTH VIOLENCE 105 (Michael H. Tonry & Mark Harrison Moore eds., 1998). This study described
the way in which the peer social context coerces youths to follow set "scripts" that can lead to violent confrontation.
Conformity to these social norms is enforced with severe sanctions. Similar studies of the everyday lives of inner
city adolescents in neighborhoods with high rates of violence include ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET:
DECENCY, VIOLENCE, ANDTHEMORALLFEOFTHEINNERCITY(1999); GEOFFREY CANADA, FIST, STICK, KNIFE, GUN
(1997), SUDHIR VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT (2000).

199. See generally Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 198.
200. Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, A Theory of Violent Events, in THE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE
OF CRIME 169, 183 (Robert Meier & Leslie Kennedy eds., 2001).
201. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157; Scott & Grisso, supranote
162.
202. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156, at 836.
203. Id.
204. See generally ROBERT NOzIK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1996).
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contextual factors that bear on the incident itself or the circumstances in which the
actor is situated, and developmental factors related to emotional, cognitive, and
other psychosocial functions residing within individuals." 5 Some models of culpability are based on rationality and volition, embracing assumptions about the
capacity to make rational choices.20 6 Actors whose decisions are impaired are less
culpable than those who are fully functional, as are those whose choices are
severely constrained by either circumstances or individual (functional) limitations. 207 Judgments about the degree of these limitations will determine if the person
is judged less culpable and deserving of a lesser punishment compared to the fully
functional defendant. These persons may be fully responsible but perhaps less than
fully culpable.
The existence of a separate system of juvenile justice, with its own language and
jurisprudence, expresses the normative view that adolescents are generally less
blameworthy than adults.20 8 Scott and Steinberg distinguish between the culpability
of adolescent offenders-which is mitigated by their developmental deficits-and
their responsibility for their behavior choices."09 In other words, adolescence as a
developmental status is mitigating but not exculpatory. 210 The developmental
deficits discussed earlier are not the deficits of an atypical adolescent but are
"normal" developmental processes common to all adolescents. To the degree that
there is variation among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these differences are
predictable and subject to a variety of contextual, circumstantial, and intraindividual factors. In this jurisprudence, the crimes of adolescents are a function of
immaturity, compared to the crimes of adults, which are the acts of morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively and emotionally deficient, actors.
This is not necessarily a question of the capacity of teenagers to understand the
harms they do and the consequences of their acts. Most developmental psychologists agree that they do. Among adults, that type of incapacity might better
describe mentally disordered persons or some mentally retarded persons. Rather,
this question considers that it is immature and otherwise defective judgment that

205. See generally Fagan, supra note 156.
206. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
152 (1968); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline ofInnocence, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL

LAW 65 (1987); Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701-02 (1988); Stephen J. Morse, Culpabilityand Control, 142 PENN. L. REV.

1587 (1994). There are notable exceptions. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, Penal Proportionalityfor the Young
Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility,in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (arguing that under

principles of penal proportionality, immaturity mitigates the blameworthiness of juvenile offenders).
207. See, e.g., WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 373 (1972). Duress is an excuse, in the
conventional view, in which the actor is placed under such a threat that "a person of reasonable fairness would be
unable to resist the pressure." Model Penal Code § 3.04. It does not imply that the balance of interests is sufficient
to outweigh the harm of the offense. But this is further complicated by a variety of factors irrelevant to this
distinction: duress usually is a response to a human actor, compared to a "choice of evils" claim that worse things
would result if a defensive action were not taken. There are other justifications and excuses in the MPC, including,
for example, mistakes, legal authority, and parental discipline. See also Fagan, supra note 156.
208. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909); MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE
LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING SERVICES: CLINIC, COURT, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY 155-58 (1970);
Zimring, supra note 110; SCHOLSSMAN, supra note 107.

209. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156, at 828-29.
210. Id.at 829.
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contributes to decisions by adolescents, along with their inability to make judgments with the same skills and capacities as adults, which reduces their culpability
and blameworthiness.
Due to these developmental influences, youths are likely to act more impulsively
and to weigh the consequences of their options differently from adults,
discounting risks and future consequences, and overvaluing (by adult standards)
peer approval, immediate consequences, and the excitement of risk taking.
These influences are predictable, systematic, and developmental in nature
(rather than an expression of personal values), and they undermine decisionmaking capacity in ways that are generally accepted as mitigating of
culpability.2"'
F. Development and Competence: The Danger of False Confessions
In Atkins, the Court noted, "The risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty, is enhanced.. .by the
'
possibility of false confessions."212
The same risks are evident in several recent
cases where juveniles falsely confessed to homicides during interrogations by
police.2" 3 Juvenile suspects have long been considered a population that is
particularly vulnerable to coercion and false confessions. Because of their
underdeveloped thought processes and immaturity, they are less likely to understand
their rights.2t 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has also long recognized this particular

211. Id.
at 830.
212. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 n.24 (citing Everington & Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring
Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13,
535 (1999)). In note 25, the Court then went on to cite two instances of mentally retarded inmates whose death
sentences were overturned and they were exonerated:
As two recent high-profile cases demonstrate, these exonerations include mentally retarded
persons who unwittingly confessed to crimes that they did not commit. See Baker, Death-Row
Inmate Gets Clemency; Agreement Ends Days of Suspense, Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1994,
p. AI; Holt & McRoberts, Porter Fully Savors First Taste of Freedom; Judge Releases Man
Once Set for Execution, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 6, 1999, p. NI.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 n.25.
213. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty
and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
See also Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 129, at 671-89 (discussing cases of false confessions by very young
offenders in homicide cases). But see Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination ofAlleged
Cases of False Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999) (suggesting that many
defendants who were described as innocent following false confessions may have been guilty despite the
miscarriage of justice produced by aggressive police interrogations, and that these cases are concentrated among
the mentally retarded). For a recent review of false confessions in capital cases, see Welch S. White, Confessions
in Capital Cases, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 979 (forthcoming).
214. See generally Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). By this reasoning, one might conclude that the development deficits that render
adolescents less culpable might also suggest that they lack sufficient adjudicative competence-by virtue of their
immaturity-to stand trial. Although there are dimensions of "immaturity" that may make an adolescent defendant
less competent to stand trial, these are only a subset of the broader range of factors that make him or her less
culpable under death penalty jurisprudence. There is empirical evidence that younger adolescents perform more
poorly than adults (and on a level similar to that of mentally retarded adults) on tests of adjudicative competence,
suggesting that their immaturity may indeed indicate that they are less competent to participate in a legal
proceeding. These differences are likely to have been understated in this research, where tasks were performed in
an artificial laboratory setting rather than in the more arousing and threatening atmosphere of an actual court
proceeding. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and
Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 333 (2003). Nevertheless, an adolescent
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vulnerability of juvenile offenders and has mandated safeguards in the form of
procedural due process for juveniles in police custody.215 Given the emotional and
intellectual immaturity of minors, harsh police interrogation may seriously
jeopardize the reliability of a confession.
Experimental evidence from controlled studies and case autopsies shows that
adolescents may be vulnerable to false confessions owing to their immaturity and
its concomitant factors: their suggestibility and their proneness to coercion. 16
Juveniles generally are more susceptible to suggestion, thus making them more
likely to implicate themselves in a crime or implicate themselves in a crime they did

defendant can be competent but sufficiently immature to warrant a discount on punishment. Both law and social
science have consistently noted that the skills required to participate effectively in one's own defense (for example,
the ability to reason, to identify information of value to counsel, and to understand the proceedings, the roles of
those participating, and the consequences of strategy decisions) would not necessarily indicate sufficient maturity
to warrant full responsibility for one's actions. See Zimring, supra note 155, at 267.
Until recently, immaturity was a secondary factor in juvenile competency standards. See, e.g., Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (holding that the competence of a juvenile defendant depended on an
assessment of "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has rational as well as factual understanding of proceeding against him"
and it was not enough that he was "oriented to time and place and ha[d] some recollection of events"). However,
recent statutes now include the term "immaturity" in setting a competency standard for adolescents. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(C) (1999).
The report shall include.. .(x)(a) An opinion as to whether at the time the juvenile engaged in the
conduct charged, as a result of immaturity or mental disease or defect, the juvenile lacked
capacity to: (1)Possess the necessary mental state required for the offense charged; (2) Conform
his or her conduct to the requirements of the law; and (3) Appreciate the criminality of his or her
conduct.
Id.
A recent thread of cases also illustrates the increasing emphasis on immaturity in determinations of a juvenile's
competence to stand trial. See In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001) (requiring that the "evaluations of a
particular juvenile's competency are to be made with regard to juvenile [developmental] norms"); Golden v.
Arkansas, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000) (stating that competency evaluations should apply an "'age-appropriate'
capacity standard to juveniles, which is different from adults"); In re Charles B., 978 P.2d 659, 660 (Ariz. 1998)
("although the Juvenile.. .has no mental disorder or disability, he fits the description of 'incompetent'.. because he
lacks a present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and he does
not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceeding against him").
Also, the weight accorded to various dimensions of culpability is influenced by the type of proceeding. The
factors that reduce an adolescent's responsibility at trial-susceptibility to peer pressure, impulsivity, and poor
emotional self-regulation, consistent with the reasoning of Atkins-may be less important in determining whether
one is competent to stand trial because, presumably, counsel is provided to ensure that legal decisions and strategies
are not pursued impulsively and that the defendant is not unduly pressured into a plea bargain or into selfincriminating testimony. By the same token, however, these culpability-reducing factors are likely to influence
behavior during interrogation (when a suspect who is impulsive or susceptible to peer pressure might be tempted,
for example, to make a false confession) when counsel is not present. Such factors are thus important when
determining whether an individual is competent to waive procedural rights and, thus, are part of the "special risk"
of false confession mentioned by the Atkins Court. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32 1.
215. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). In Gallegos, the
Court recognized the limited ability of a minor to comprehend constitutional concepts:
[A] 14 year old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will
confront him when he is made accessible only to police. That is to say, we deal with a person
who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own
interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. In Haley, the Court made nearly identical statements about a male suspect who was 15
years of age. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600.
216. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997); Gerald
Robin, Juvenile Interrogation and Confessions, 10 J.POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 224 (1982).
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not commit. This often results as a reaction to what a child would perceive as a
2 17
threat from an authority figure. Suggestibility is inversely related to intelligence,
increasing their risk of susceptibility to giving false confessions.2 18 In laboratory
studies, adolescents with low intelligence were much more susceptible to leading
questions, confabulate more, and are more acquiescent with interrogators. 219 The
more suggestible subjects are, the less accurate they are in recalling details, and the
more erroneous information is produced during interrogation. 22' Low IQ subjects
are more likely to believe that falsely confessing will have little or no consequences
because of their knowledge of the truth of the matter and belief that truth always
wins out. This naivet6 renders low functioning subjects at higher risk for falsely
confessing than normally functioning subjects. Combined with susceptibility to
acquiescence, suggestibility, compliance with authority, and the proclivity to
confabulate put low IQ subjects at significantly higher risk for false confession in
the context of a police interrogation. 221 The case autopsies by Professors Tanenhaus
and Drizin 222 show that aggressive police tactics during interrogations of
adolescents often produce confessions that later are proved false.
The recent well-publicized reversals of the convictions of five New York City
teenagers, ages fifteen to seventeen at the time of the attack, accused of brutally
raping a female jogger in Central Park illustrates the vulnerability of adolescents to
giving false confessions. More than a decade after their convictions and after some
had served long prison sentences, the real attacker came forward and confessed to
the crime. 223 DNA tests of Mr. Reyes' semen and other materials confirmed his
presence at the crime scene. The absence of DNA evidence from any of the five
teens at the crime scene motivated their exoneration, in addition to inconsistencies
in the details they provided on the victim's clothing and the attack itself.
The persistence of false confession cases involving both the young defendants
described by Professors Tanenhaus and Drizin and the older teenagers in the Central
Park jogger case, coupled with laboratory evidence of adolescents' susceptibility
to suggestion and vulnerability to coercion, places adolescents at elevated risk of
making false confessions to both capital and other serious crimes. In experiments
and other laboratory studies, the spread in susceptibility scores in these experiments
suggests that many defendants older than sixteen would be prone to false
confessions.224 And, while these experimental studies involve adolescents below age

217. G.H. Gudjonsson, Suggestibility and Compliance among Alleged False Confessorsand Resisters in
Criminal Trials, 31 MED., SCI. &L. 147, 149 (1991).
218. S.J. Ceci et al., Suggestibility of Children'sMemory: PsycholegalImplications, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 38 (1987).

219. Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance,
Internalization,and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 129 (1996).

220. Saul M. Kassin & H. Sukel, CoercedConfessions and the Jury:An Experimental Test of the "Harmless
Error" Rule, 21 LAw &HUM. BEHAV. 27,42 (1997).
221. Gudjonsson, supra note 217.
222. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supranote 129, at 671-89 (discussing cases of false confessions by very young
offenders in homicide cases).
223. Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, New Light on Jogger'sRape Calls Evidence into Question, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2002, at Al.
224. See infra section IV and note 246.
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sixteen, most of the Central Park defendants were above sixteen and death-eligible
had theirs been a capital case.
The Supreme Court in both Gallegos225 and Haley226 has been concerned with
two primary problems in the interrogation of minors. The first inquiry is whether
or not a juvenile has the capacity to comprehend his or her Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination. Although the standard Miranda warning is given, there
are arguments that the vocabulary contained in the Miranda warning is too advanced for a teenager's comprehension or that the warning is not given to children until
after a confession has already been attained. The second question revolves around
the reliability of "voluntary" confessions of juveniles in police custody. Given the
emotional and intellectual immaturity of minors, both the condition and process of
interrogation may seriouslyjeopardize the reliability of a confession and place them
at risk for a death sentence and the specter of wrongful execution.
G. Converting Mitigation to a CategoricalException of Juveniles from Capital
Punishment
The convergence of scientific evidence on immaturity from developmental
psychology with the nascent biological evidence raises the question of a categorical
exception to criminal punishment generally forjuveniles. That is not at issue in this
article, 227 although a variety of rationales have been advanced for a categorical
reduction in sentence severity for adolescents.228 Here, for proportionality considerations, and precisely because death is different, a general exception should
apply to the most severe form of punishment.2 2 9 The Thompson Court stated, in
effect, that immaturity was categoricallya mitigator of culpability in capital cases,
but that case-by-case determinations might not adequately protect all juveniles so
exposed.23 ° In other words, the "narrowing jurisprudence" of adult death penalty
cases-emphasizing the avoidance of unwarranted death sentences via procedural
rules-would not work for juveniles. Moreover, the recent high rates of jurisdictional waiver or transfer of adolescent offenders to adult court suggests that the
boundary between the juvenile court-where the mitigating status of adolescence
is internalized into the court's jurisprudence 2 31 -and the criminal court that ignores

225. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
226. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
227. From the outset of the juvenile court, its founders recognized that some youths would necessarily be
expelled and be subject to adult punishment. See Tanenhaus, supra note 110. Juvenile offenders often commit
crimes whose seriousness commands harsh punishment. See Zimring, supra note 110. There is a vigorous debate
as to which juveniles should be subject to punishment as adults, how they should be identified, the legal arrangements and procedural mechanisms that regulate the flow of cases that are relocated from the juvenile court to the
criminal court, and how they should be punished once transferred. See Francis Allen, Foreword,in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT ix (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zirnring eds., 2000). See also Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Jurisdictional Transfer, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS AND PUB. POL'Y 101 (2002).

228. See. e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS (1996) (discussing a "youth discount" in the context of a unified
criminal court that eliminates separate jurisdiction and jurisprudence for adolescents).
229. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 135, for objections to the use of proportionality as a rationale to
categorically exempt juveniles from capital punishment.
230. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156 (raising much the same argument).
231. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in New Juvenile Court,31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 510-12 (1984);
see also Scott, supra note 85.
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it, has been severely breached.2 32 The mitigation doctrine loses its case-by-case
force where there is a flood of "waived" juveniles facing long and harsh terms of
criminal punishments for crimes far less serious than murder.
If adolescent murderers are less culpable than their adult counterparts because
of developmental deficits and are particularly vulnerable to false confessions and
other limitations in adjudicative competence, then this immaturity places them well
below the threshold of culpability articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's "death-isdifferent" jurisprudence. This applies to adolescents as a group that differs in its
culpability for its offenses, not simply as a subgroup of criminal offenders. Accordingly, the presumption of immaturity can be applied to most individuals in the age
group, based on predictable trajectories of adolescent development. Alternately,
individualized assessments leave triers of fact at the mercy of imperfect diagnostic
assessments to determine which adolescents are "mature" and which are not.
Moreover, categorical exemptions reduce the likelihood of racial or regional
variation in the determination of who is death-worthy and who is not.233 This
determination is even more complicated for juveniles than adults given the
externalities that arise whenjuveniles commit well-publicized homicides. 234 Recent
data show, for example, that there is an unavoidable conflation of race and
homicide, raising further tensions in the search for justice.235 Indeed, the conflation
of race and blameworthiness is a disturbing specter that unfortunately has a long
and painful history in criminal justice.236 In capital cases, such determinations about
culpability seem to fall more heavily on African Americans and other ethnic
minorities 237 and are complicated by the structural circumstances that obstruct
assignment of competent and experienced capital defense counsel.238 It also
insulates against the limitations of scientific
instruments to accurately distinguish
2 39
who is mature of judgment and who is not.
In Atkins, the Court created a categorical exception for the mentally retarded
because, like adolescents, their culpability is seriously diminished and the risk of
false confession is high. Why, then, is there not a similar exception for adolescents?
How can the law recognize and express the recognition of diminished responsibility

232. See generally THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE

CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
233. Glen L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-97, in
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), availableat http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
techinical_appendix/reasearch-report.html) (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).

234. See, e.g., Michael Browning et al., The Case of Lionel Tate. Boy, 14, Gets Life in TV Wrestling Death:
Killing of6-Yr.-Old Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay,FloridaJudge Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1
(noting that the death occurred while Tate was "allegedly demonstrating wrestling techniques on her"); Dana
Canedy, At 14, a Life Sentence: Boy Killed Girl in "Wrestling" Murder,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001,
at 1.
235. See FRANKLIN E. ZMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (2000); FELD, supra note 111.
236. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE (2001).
237. Pierce & Radelet, supra note 233.

238. Incompetent defense counsel is the major source of serious trial error in capital cases, producing a
corrosively high rate of sentencing and trial errors. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why
There Is So Much Errorin CapitalCases,and What Can Be Done About It, Columbia University School of Law,
2002, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).

239. See generally Scott & Steinberg, supra note 156.
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among the less culpable mentally retarded who commit murder, but not of the less
culpable juveniles who do the same?
IV. ATKINS AND THE MATURITY HEURISTIC OF THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR JUVENILES
The categorical exception to capital punishment granted in Atkins should be
applied to juveniles who commit murder. The competencies required for a juvenile
to make decisions to engage in crime occupy common psychological ground with
decisions made by those whose capacities are impaired by emotional disturbance
or mental illness: susceptibility to or domination by peers, inability to control
impulses, and the inability to grasp the consequences of their acts. Just as there is
controversy, however, over measurement of mental retardation and determinations
of the thresholds that apply, the components of "immaturity" amongjuveniles invite
similar complications both in terms of measurement and of clinical interpretation.
Drawing these boundaries poses both normative and scientific challenges. The
difficulties and statistical error rates in measuring immaturity for juveniles invite
complexity in the consistent application of the law.24 The emerging jurisprudence
of mental retardation may well create the same tensions and dilemmas.24 ' The
choice of a fixed boundary either for immature adolescents or mentally retarded
adults brings with it another set of problems-the unacceptable risks of trial and
sentencing errors that could lead to executions of those whose culpability fails to
reach constitutional thresholds,242 or whose false confessions may lead to tragic and
unthinkable miscarriages of justice.
The execution of an adolescent who is less than fully mature-whose capacity
for choice is impaired by immaturity in the dimensions of cognitive and emotional
development that adults have achieved-meets this definition of error. There is
considerable variability in adolescent development, both between individuals for
specific components of maturity243 and within individuals for these same
components. This variability in adolescent development means that by ages
seventeen, eighteen, or perhaps even age twenty, many will not reach the
developmental thresholds of maturity on the markers of culpability established by
Atkins, the same markers that have been validated and confirmed by social and

240. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157. Adolescents are less competent decision makers than adults,
largely because their capacities for autonomous choice, self-management, risk perception, responsibility,
temperance, long-term perspective, and calculation of future consequences are deficient compared to adults, and
these traits influence decision making in ways that can lead to risky conduct. Id. at 801.
241. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2003); John Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the Volitionally Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
242. In Gardnerv. Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court once again emphasized the notion
that "death is different." In Gardner,the Court describes this difference: "From the point of view of the defendant,
it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in
taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action." Gardner, 430
U.S. at 357-58. A death sentence and execution of a defendant whose culpability does not rise to this threshold is
a sentencing error, which appellate courts are obligated to reverse. See Liebman et al., supra note 238.
243. Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 157 (discussing social science evidence that age-linked differences
in maturity of judgment account for differences in decision making).
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emerging biological science of adolescent development as reliable predictors of full
capacity for competent and mature behavioral choices.
Consider one developmental dimension-consequential judgment. Because the
development of consequential judgment is a normal function, we have no reason to
assume that the distribution of this or any other developmental competence is
exceptional for youths engaged in criminal conduct. Indeed, we can assume a
"normal" distribution of development. Typically, social science shows that the
attainment of any feature of development follows a "normal" distribution,2" where
most persons reach a threshold by a certain age-for example, sixteen years, but
some reach this threshold well before this age and others reach it well after this age.
This type of distribution is known as a "bell-shaped curve" and is characteristic of
the distribution across populations of many features of social, psychological, and
physical development.245
Let us assume that on this measure, then, empirical studies show that most
teenagers reach the test score threshold of maturity (i.e., the generally accepted
threshold of maturity for this dimension) at sixteen years of age. That is, given a
normal distribution, most teenagers-about two in three-have reached this
threshold of maturity at that age. Accordingly, a considerable percentage-perhaps
a third-of all adolescents has not fully matured on this dimension by age sixteen.
Let us assume, also, that the standard deviation for this measure 246 -the spread in
the distribution of ages at which adolescents reach the threshold of maturity for this
specific dimension-is equivalent to approximately one year of age. That means that
by age seventeen, perhaps one in six still is immature in this dimension of maturity.
By age eighteen, perhaps one in fifteen still lacks this specific capacity for choice
and maturity of judgment.
But the heuristic of maturity becomes more complex when we recognize that
several dimensions of adolescent development comprise maturity. 247 Now, consider
that these several dimensions of psychosocial maturity are less than perfectly
correlated and cannot be substituted for one another 8 The determination of
maturity then would require independent assessments over several dimensions. We

244. On a "normal" or universal developmental measure, where the norms have been estimated from many
studies under a variety of sampling and measurement conditions, we have no reason to assume that there will be
large sample differences.
245. A bell-shaped curve represents the normal distribution of population values. See, e.g., SCHUYLER W.
HUCK & WILLIAM H. CORMIER, READING STATISTICS & RESEARCH (2d ed. 1996). In a normal distribution, a few

scores are at either end of the distribution, and most are in the middle grouped around the average (or mean) score.
If one knows the mean and standard deviation (or variability) of a score or measure of developmental competency
of persons at various ages, one can predict what percentage of the population is likely to have obtained that
threshold by a specific age. The empirical rule for any normal distribution is (1) 68% of the values fall within one
standard deviation of the mean, (2) 95% of the values fall within two standard deviations of the mean, and (3) 99.7%
of the values fall within three standard deviations of the mean. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freeman, Reference
Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994).
246. Standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a distribution of a test score or any measure around
a mean. We assume that the distribution is "normal," where the spread around the mean is equal on either side and
the test scores are concentrated near the average. In a normal distribution, 68 percent of the cases lie within one
standard deviation of the mean; approximately 16 percent lie one standard deviation or more below the mean. See,
e.g., FRANK HAGAN, RESEARCH METHODS INCRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 347-48 (4th ed. 1997).
247. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157; Scott & Grisso, supra note 162.
248. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 157; Scott & Grisso, supra note 162.
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can reasonably expect that the probability of reaching a threshold of maturity along
several of these dimensions will require a complex calculation, where the joint or
conditional probability of an adolescent reaching the accepted threshold of maturity
along more than one dimension compounds and becomes increasingly small. Under
current death penalty jurisprudence, each dimension of immaturity is a potential
mitigator.249 The cumulative probability that a minor may be immature grows
incrementally as a defendant falls farther and farther below the high threshold of
culpability for a capital offense, increasing the risk of sentencing error under the
U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. The risk grows larger when we
compound this calculus across several dimensions of maturity and culpability.
Although the law is otherwise comfortable with bright lines to legally define
competencies for adolescents,25 ° the threshold for the attainment of sufficient
maturity to attribute culpability in capital cases is a far more complex
determination. Because what is at stake is death, the boundary cannot be determined
simply by examining the average age by which most adolescents attain one or any
number of the several indicia of maturity. In addition to these expected age
thresholds, variability in the pace at which most adolescents reach that threshold is
critical. Variability means that a substantial proportion of adolescents at ages
eighteen, seventeen, or sixteen are likely to score well below the threshold for
maturity, including many of the constituent elements of retardation identified in
Atkins. 25 ' That is, some non-negligible percentage of adolescent murderers will not
have achieved the threshold of culpability that capital jurisprudence requires. A
death sentence handed down to a defendant who is below eighteen years of age and
who is substantially immature in impulse control and emotional regulation, for
example, might invite the most serious form of capital sentencing error-the
condemnation of a youth whose culpability does not rise to constitutional
standards-in perhaps ten percent or more of the cases involving offenders below
age eighteen at the time of their crime. When the determination of culpability is
compounded across multiple dimensions of immaturity, the denial of the reality of
this variability in favor of an absolute threshold of maturity at seventeen or even
sixteen years of age invites the prospect of fallibility-error--on at least one or
more dimensions of mitigation tied to immaturity.
There is an obvious and important tension between this maturity heuristic and
normative views of adulthood and maturity. Normative views might assign maturity
for criminal culpability at a specific age, based on broad societal views of what
capacities most adolescents have attained by that age. But the empirical reality of
a progression of adolescent maturation that occurs variably over several dimensions
or indicia of culpability creates a complex calculus of maturity based on multiple
dimensions of adolescent development. In fact, there are two normative tensions in
this framework, one that reflects concerns over the execution of minors and a
second arising from concerns of death penalty advocates for penal proportionality.
Tipping in one direction or the other has "legitimacy" costs-for opponents of the
249. Unlike the determination of mental retardation that results in a diagnostic classification, immaturity is
not classified using a similar heuristic. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
250. Scott, supra note 85.
251. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; See also social science evidence cited supra note 24.
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death penalty, the moral authority of law and legal institutions is threatened when
capital punishment is imposed unjustly. For supporters of capital punishment, the
moral authority of the criminal law is corroded when punishments do not scale
proportionately to the severity of the crime or the culpability of the offender.2 52 A
maturity heuristic offers a rationalization under current death penalty jurisprudence
for withholding executions for offenders as old as twenty-one, when the risk of
error due to false claims of maturity declines to near zero.253 That is not the case
now: under Stanford, and despite the immaturity of many adolescents at ages
sixteen, seventeen, or even at eighteen, execution is permitted, inviting the risk of
execution of adolescents whose immaturity renders them not fully culpable for their
crimes.
Resolution of this tension may come from the law's comfort with bright lines of
maturity that apply to specific competencies. For many legally regulated areas,
including those that require the skills associated with maturity, there is a generally
accepted upper boundary of eighteen for nearly all behavioral functions of
adulthood.254 Many of these roles require mature judgment (i.e., voting, medicaf
consent); others require behavioral regulation (i.e., drinking, military service). The
states assign criminal liability to wrongdoing at no more than age eighteen, although
many assign it at even younger ages for specific crimes. For some offenses and
offenders, the threshold drops as low as thirteen years of age.255 However, the
elevated arrest rates of adolescents tried as adults may be a sign that the assumption
of maturity that informs these legal policies evidently is flawed.256
The balancing of tensions among this triad of normative concerns suggests that
58 eras of juvenile
perhaps the norms of the Kent 257 and Gault2
jurisprudence should
apply to the threshold of capital culpability for adolescents. Not long ago, Justice
Harry Blackmun noted how the tension between fundamental fairness and
individualized judgments haunts the administration of the death penalty. The
juvenile death penalty epitomizes this tension. Avoiding false assumptions about
maturity that can easily lead to sentencing errors in capital sentences, maintaining
popular demand for penal proportionality, and sustaining consistency in the

252. See generally DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF

JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); Zimring, supra note 155.
253. Except in cases of mental retardation or mental illness.
254. Scott, supra note 85.
255. Patricia Torbet et al., Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, National Center for
Juvenile Justice, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime: Research Report (1996), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/statresp.txt (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
256. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 227. Recent studies on the responses of adolescent offenders subjected to
criminal punishment show that they are more likely to be rearrested and re-incarcerated compared to similarly
situated youths who are retained in the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Donna Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the
Adult Criminal Justice System 27 CRIME & JUSTICE 81 (2000). Many state policies are designed simply to
incapacitate youths who they see as dangerous and are agnostic with respect to either their amenability to change
or their maturity. Some policies view immaturity as an indicator of continued risk of offending. These arguments
are orthogonal to the assessment of culpability in capital cases. The implication of higher recidivism rates is simply
the over-prediction ofdangerousness based on an equivalence of criminality with dangerousness and maturity, and
the toxic reaction of adolescents to harsh, non-therapeutic retributive regimes of correctional intervention. See
Fagan, supra note 227.
257. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
258. In re Gault, 385 U.S. 965 (1966).
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threshold for attainment of maturity and criminal liability should lead the Court to
the conclusion that juveniles should be afforded the same protection by the Court
that the mentally retarded were given in Atkins.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Juveniles and mentally retarded persons are two groups that face substantial risk
of sentencing error when facing the death penalty. Beyond the fact that their
disabilities are mitigating factors in assessing criminal conduct, these disabilities
place each group at substantial risk for providing false confessions,259 as well as
limiting their ability to competently and, to use the language of Atkins, meaningfully
assist defense counsel. 26 0 Because defendants with diminished competence and
culpability face an elevated likelihood of reversible sentencing error, principles of
proportionality should govern these situations. Accordingly, juvenile defendants,
26 1
like the mentally retarded, should be exempted from capital punishment.
This is a narrowing argument, not a normative one about the moral status of the
law of capital punishment. That is, a categorical exemption for juveniles below the
age of eighteen from execution is agnostic about capital punishment for those whose
maturity and competence reaches societal norms. The alternative-creating
exempted categories such as the immature or the mentally retarded-invites
disputes about how to reliably establish membership. Although legislatures and
appellate courts can create language that scientifically and reliably expresses the
underlying complexity and dimensionality of these categories, there inevitably will
be subjective risks of misdiagnosis, testing error, instrument unreliability, or other
limits of behavioral science.
In the case of juveniles, the significance of "immaturity" as a mitigating factor
in criminal punishment can be reinforced by placing it in the context of its broader
role in the legal regulation of adolescence and the law's comfort with bright lines.
Here, then, the reconciliation of normative views of deserved and proportional
punishment with social science evidence of diminished culpability and variability
of adolescents in reaching the thresholds of maturity can reinforce the
jurisprudential logic of a ban on executions of youths who commit murder below
eighteen years of age.
This exemption would avoid the many errors that characterize the "broken
system" of capital punishment that is so riddled with serious, reversible error.262 The
empirical reality of capital sentencing suggests that current procedures and
jurisprudence are not reliable in sorting out who is or is not sufficiently culpable.

259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 n.25.

260. Id. at 304 ("mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution
because of the possibility that they will unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit, their lesser ability to
give their counsel meaningful assistance, and the facts that they are typically poor witnesses and that their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes").
261. See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 135.
262. James S. Liebman et al., supra note 238; James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: ErrorRates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1839 (2000) (describing the system of prosecution and sentencing in
capital cases as "broken" due to the very high rates of serious, reversible trial error, averaging 68% in all
documented state direct appeal, state post-conviction appeal, and federal habeas corpus decisions from
1973-1995).
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Even when individualized assessments are conducted using modem scientific and
clinical tools, the risks of error due to measurement and diagnostic limitations
suggest that it is neither reliable nor efficient for each court to assess the
competency of each juvenile individually. The precise conditions of immaturity,
incapacity, and incompetency are difficult to consistently and fairly express in a
capital sentencing context.263 Further, cognitive and volitional immaturity might be
easily concealed by demeanor or physical appearance and, more importantly,
obscured by the gruesome details of a murder and its emotional impact on the
victim's family. These limitations invite an attribution of culpability to the
seemingly remorseless and competent adolescent whose developmental reality may
be exactly the opposite, raising the risk of a death sentence where it is not
deserved.2 "
The Court's interest in procedural reliability and fairness calls for action to
reduce high risks of sentencing errors. One critical area requiring further attention
is the execution of juveniles, where care and caution are needed to reinforce the
judicial system's legitimacy. Atkins has established a critical path for honoring
principles of fairness while retaining the core jurisprudential theories of immaturity,
incapacity, and mitigation in capital punishment. Extending the Court's Atkins
reasoning to sentencing determinations forjuveniles not only maintains the integrity
of the Court's Atkins decision, it more importantly reduces the risk of executing
children who are less than fully culpable for their crimes.
The Missouri Supreme Court is the first to extend the logic of Atkins to
adolescents and ban the execution of persons who commit murder before reaching
age eighteen.265 In reversing the death sentence of Christopher Simmons in Simmons
v. Roper,266 the Missouri court located its decision in the intersection of
jurisprudential theories that recognize the diminished capacity of adolescents with
the multiple theories of the Atkins Court. That is, the Simmons court cited the broad
acceptance of the immaturity of adolescents articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Eddings and Thompson and noted that the risks of false confession attached to
juveniles due to the similarity of their cognitive deficits that informed the Atkins
decision. Again invoking Atkins, the Simmons court found that such executions
violated the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The
Simmons court noted that many adolescents may lack the moral development and
reasoning capacity necessary to satisfy the requirements in capital jurisprudence of
sufficient mental capacity to meet the threshold of "deterrence."
The Simmons court also addressed the test of the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford
that "a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile
offenders." The Simmons court's opinion noted that, since the U.S. Supreme Court's
1989 decision in Stanford, no state has lowered the age for execution from eighteen
to seventeen or sixteen, five more states have banned the practice of executing
juvenile offenders through legislative action, and a sixth has banned it through a
263. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 135, at 101.
264. See, e.g., Martha Grace Duncan, So Young and So Untender: Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1520-22 (2002).
265. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (W.R. Price, Jr., J., dissenting).
266. The Missouri court resentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
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judicial decision. Including the Missouri decision, a total of seventeen states, in
addition to federal courts, require a minimum age of eighteen for a death sentence.
The court also noted that the infrequency of execution ofjuveniles-only six states
have executed a juvenile since Stanford-as further evidence of this emerging
national consensus.267 The Simmons court also recognized international standards,
rejected fourteen years ago in Stanford, citing the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in its decision.268
Atkins has established a critical path for honoring principles of fairness while
retaining the core jurisprudential theories of immaturity, incapacity, and mitigation
in capital punishment. Extending the Court's Atkins reasoning to sentencing
determinations for juveniles not only maintains the integrity of the Court's Atkins
decision, it more importantly reduces the risk of executing children who are less
than fully culpable for their crimes.

267. The Simmons court also noted that twelve states and the District of Columbia bar the death penalty
entirely.
268. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 411 (citing Article 37(a) of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child). The same article the court cites in its opinion, provides that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below eighteen
years of age." Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37(a), U.N. at
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmi/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). See also George J. Annas,
Moral Progress,MentalRetardation, and the Death Penalty, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1814,1817 (2002) (predicting
that the public will support an extension of the Atkins decision to murder defendants ages 16 or 17).

